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THE BATTLE OF THE MUSIC INDUSTRY:
THE DISTRIBUTION OF AUDIO AND VIDEO
WORKS VIA THE INTERNET,
MUSIC AND MORE
David Balaban*

INTRODUCTION
Just a few years ago, the little known phenomenon of the Internet
was in its infancy. However, in the last decade of the twentieth
century the Internet exploded into an awesome resource of
information that is constantly redefining the capabilities of
communication, and consequently, the way that business is
conducted around the world.1 With sales over the Internet projected
to reach the $717 billion mark in 2001, up from $377 billion in 2000,
the Internet has opened up new markets and streamlined old
markets.2 It allows for the transfer of mass amounts of information
between users, perhaps even millions of users, with the mere click of
a mouse.3
However, the growth of the Internet has not been entirely without
drawbacks, especially regarding privacy and the protection of
* David Balaban graduated from Rutgers University in 1998 having completed Bachelors
Degrees in Music and in Finance. Forthwith, he earned his juris doctorate at Fordham
School of Law in 2001. While at Fordham, Mr. Balaban attended undergraduate classes at
the Juilliard School of Music. In 2000, he distinguished himself as a winner of the annual
Entertainment Law Initiative legal writing contest sponsored by the National Academy of
Recording Arts and Sciences (NARAS) and the American Bar Association (ABA).
1
See generally Center for Research in Electronic Commerce, Graduate School of
Business, the University of Texas at Austin, and Cisco Systems, Measuring the Internet
Economy, (Jan. 2001), at http://www.Internetindicators.com (last visited Mar. 2001).
2
See
NUA
Analysis:
Internet
Generated
Revenue
1996-2000,
at
http://www.nua.com/surveys/analysis/graphs_charts/comparisons/total_revenue_generated_
2 (last visited Oct. 2001).
3
See How Many Online?, at
http://www.nua.com/surveys/how_many_online/index.html (last visited Oct. 2001).
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intellectual property.4 While the increased capacity for worldwide
communication has provided many advances for our society, it also
poses many problems in its regulation.5 The anonymity and general
unaccountability of users on the Internet coupled with inadequate
security measures protecting information transfers hold far-reaching
implications concerning the accessibility of privileged, private, or
copyrighted information.6 For example, how secure are credit card
and social security numbers submitted on web pages to facilitate
purchases via the Internet? What processes are available to web
purchasers to verify that orders placed over the Internet have gone
through a legitimate service and not through fraudulent Internet
services created by scam artists? Moreover, do we really want our
children to be able to view pornography with the ease that they can
access the latest baseball scores?
In the area of copyright law nowhere has the advent of the Internet
stirred up more controversy than in the music industry, specifically,
in the distribution of audio works over the Internet.7 Whereas the
growth of the Internet has spawned many other industries, the new
medium has the potential to devastate the music industry because it
provides an easy means to perpetuate the unauthorized dissemination
of copyrighted musical works.8 Taken to its theoretical limit,
without copyright protection, a single copy of a sound recording
could be uploaded onto the Internet to provide an unlimited number
of perfect but unlicensed copies available for free distribution.9 Just
4
See Beth Givens, Internet Privacy: Privacy Expectations in a High Tech World, 16
COMPUTER & HIGH TECH L.J. 347, 351 (May 2001); Fighting Fire with Fire: How SDMI
Saves Intellectual Property, at http://pacificresearch.org/issues/tech/eclips9908.html (last
visited Oct. 2001).
5
Some issues of concern on the Internet are gambling, the policy for granting domain
names, spamming, security, encryption, First Amendment freedom of speech issues,
privacy, and content rating and filtering. See generally John F. Delaney & M. Lorraine
Ford, Representing the New Media Company 2001 The Law of The Internet: A Summary of
U.S. Internet Caselaw And Legal Developments, 631 PLI/Pat 31 (Jan. 2001).
6
Id. at 46-59.
7
See Heather D. Rafter, William Sloan Coats, John G. Given & Vickie L. Feeman,
Streaming into the Future: Music and Video Online, 590 PLI/Pat 559, 563-64 (Feb. 2000).
8
Supra note 1, at 9-10.
9
See Rex S. Heike and Heather D. Rafter, Rough Justice in Cyberspace: Liability on
the Electronic Frontier, COMPUTER LAW, July 1994, at 6. The combination of digital audio
technology and networks such as the Internet produces an environment where music can
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one compact disc (hereinafter “CD”), once uploaded onto the
Internet, can be reproduced at no cost to supply the entire world with
unauthorized copies of an artist’s songs.10 Moreover, after a CD has
been uploaded onto the Internet, potential purchasers with access to
the Internet may have little reason to buy physical copies of the CD.
After all, the music is available for free on the Internet. Presently,
the music industry has not been able to enforce a reliable means by
which to collect royalties for works distributed over the Internet.11
Hence, artists may find themselves uncompensated for distribution of
their music over the new medium.12
In fact, Internet services that perpetuate the unauthorized copying
of music, such as Napster and Gnutella were created for the sole
purpose of facilitating the transfer of music files over the Internet.13
They give users an easy way of “pirating”, or downloading, sound
recordings without properly compensating the musical artists who
created the recordings.14 Since it has been estimated that, if left
easily be distributed to an unlimited amount of computer users. See also Heather D. Rafter,
William Sloan Coats, John G. Given, and Vickie L. Feeman, 20th Annual Institute on
Computer Law Streaming Into the Future: Music and Video Online, 590 PLI/Pat 559, at 569
(Feb. 2000). In accordance with the first sale doctrine a person is permitted to buy a song
from the Internet, such as a song downloaded in MP3 format, and then sell or give that same
copy of the song to a friend. However, the first sale doctrine does not permit a person to sell
or otherwise transfer possession of a song obtained unlawfully, such as a pirated version.
Likewise, the first sale doctrine would not allow a person to sell or give away a reproduction
of a MP3 file if that same person only paid for one copy and was keeping the original
download on his or her own computer.
10
See Fighting Fire with Fire: How SDMI Saves Intellectual Property, at
http://pacificresearch.org/issues/tech/eclips9908.html (last visited Oct. 2001).
11
See Dawn C. Chmielewski, Record Labels, Music Publishers at Impasse (Aug. 23,
2001), at http://www.siliconvalley.com/docs/news/svtop/music082401.htm (last visited
Nov. 2001).
12
See Internet Music Debate Plays Out on Capitol Hill (July 11, 2000), at
http://www.cnn.com/2000/ALLPOLITICS/stories/07/11/napster.hearing/ (last visited Nov.
2001).
13
See Damien A. Riehl, Electronic Commerce in the 21st Century: Article Peer-to-Peer
Distribution System: Will Napster, Gnutella, and Freenet Create a Copyright Nirvana or an
Gehenna?, 27 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 1761, 1767 (2001). Napster and Gnutella link users
with other users for the purpose of facilitating the copying of music files. For more
information on Napster, Gnutella, and Freenet, see zeropaid.com, at
http://www.zeropaid.com (last visited Nov. 2000).
14
See Robert C. Edwards, The Napster Litigation: Who Said Nothing in this World is
Free? A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc.: Problems Presented, Solutions Explored, and
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unfettered by ensuing lawsuits, Napster would have had 75 million
users by the end of 2000, the music industry has been ardently
seeking an equitable balance between copyright owners of sound
recordings and the dissemination of their works over the Internet.15
Without such a balance, the advent of the Internet has the potential to
usurp “the record industry as we know it today,” leaving musical
artists uncompensated for their efforts and redefining the
relationships among musicians, record labels, music publishers, and
the performing rights societies.16
Moreover, the result of litigation in the music industry will have
far-reaching implications in other industries as well. The publishing,
television, and film industries all have a stake in the development of
copyright law on the Internet.17 For example, although only in its
infancy, the publishing industry has already begun the process of
online e-book distribution.18 As of July 2000 Stephen King became
one of the first authors to experiment in publishing his books solely
on the Internet when he made a portion of his latest serial novel, The
Plant, available on his website.19
King experimented with
distributing his intellectual property for compensation over the
Internet by asking his readers to send him payment after
downloading any of the installments of the serial, which he planned
to release gradually in eight separate parts.20 King asked for $1.00
for each download of any of the first three installments in the story
and $2.00 for each download of any of the last five installments.21
Furthermore, he stated that he would continue to release serials of the
Answers Posed, 89 KY. L.J. 835 (2000/2001).
15
A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 2000 WL 1170106 (N.D. Cal. 2000).
16
Id. at *903.
17
See Jack Valenti, There’s No Free Hollywood, N.Y. TIMES, June 21, 2000, at
http://www.eff.org/IP/Video/20000621_valenti_oped.html (last visited Oct. 2001).
18
Id. For evolving case law concerning publication of e-books on the Internet, see
Random House v. Rosetta Books, 150 F. Supp. 2d 613 (S.D.N.Y. 2001).
19
Stephen King’s serial was available for download at http://www.stephenking.com
(last visited Mar. 2001). Stephen King charged $1.00 to download each of the first three
installments in the serial and $2.00 per download for installments IV, V, and VI.
20
Id. King originally speculated that The Plant would continue for eight installments
and cost readers only $13.00. See also Paul Simon, Stephen King Temporarily Prunes
‘Plant’ E-Novel, THE BOSTON HERALD, November 30, 2000, at 24.
21
See Neil J. Rosini & Howard M. Singer, Music and the Internet, 545 PLI/Pat 865,
871.
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story on the Internet only so long as 75% of the persons who
downloaded each serial of the story sent him payment.22 In the first
week of its availability online, an estimated 76.4% of readers,
representing 116,200 downloads, mailed King $1.00.23 However,
after a fair showing on the first serial it is estimated that King
received payment for just 70% of the downloads of his second
serial,24 which further degraded to only a 46% payment rate by the
fourth installment.25 With such a drop-off in the payment rate,
whether or not King will complete the serial is a question that only
he can answer.
What this means for the publishing industry is unclear, but
following from Stephen King’s example, soon entire books or even
entire libraries representing multitudes of copyrighted works may be
posted on the Internet.26 Similar advances in technology will
modernize the television and film industries. With the impending
invention of broadband technology, it is very likely that in the near
future users will be able to upload and download even full length
movies over the Internet with relative ease.27
Some have argued, however, that free downloads available over
the Internet will come at the direct expense of visual and recording
22
What percentage of downloaders paid for Stephen King’s “The Plant”?, at
http://bookspot.com/know/kingplant.htm (last visited Aug. 2000).
23
Id.
24
Id.
25
See M.J. Rose, Stephen King’s “Plant” Uprooted (Nov. 28, 2000), at
http://www.wired.com/news/culture/0,1284,40356,00.html (last visited Mar. 2001).
26
See Robert Hertzberg, A Good E-Read?; For now, Electronic Books Will Make their
also
Mark
in
Education,
WORLD
(Nov.
1,
2000);
see
INTERNET
http://www.stephenking.com/download.html (last visited Nov. 2001); Stephen King Buries
the Plant, at http://cbsnews.com/now/story/0,1597,253187-412,00.shtml (last visited Nov.
2001). It seems that, at least for the moment in light of the dwindling payments, Stephen
King has decided not to continue with installments in the series. Having already written the
first six installments, King has decided to devote his energies toward other endeavors for the
time being.
27
To a limited extent the technology already exists in the form of DivX, a new
technology that allows PC users with high-speed DSL lines or cable modems to download
feature films from the Internet in less than two hours. However, DivX was pulled from the
market because of its failure to implement adequate security measures to protect
copyrighted content. See Clyde H. Wilson, Jr. & M. Susan Wilson, Cyberspace Litigation:
Chasing the Information Highway Bandits, 36-OCT JTLATRIAL 48, at 50 (Oct. 2000).
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artists, reducing the incentive for these creative talents to produce
treasured works.28 Due to the free dissemination of copyrighted
works over the Internet, in the long run, our society will suffer from
the loss of art, in all of its forms, reducing the profound positive
influence that art has upon our culture.29 In short, the millennium of
the Internet will eliminate the modern day Michelangelo because his
services are no longer valued. Thus, it is imperative for the
prosperity of our art and culture that a balance is accorded between
copyright owners and the distribution of their works via the Internet.
This note will examine the existing landscape of copyright law
concerning the distribution of audio and video works over the
Internet and suggest that a compromise be struck between copyright
owners and the distribution of their works over the Internet. Part II
elaborates upon the means available to freely disseminate
copyrighted audio works over the Internet. Part III contains a
summary of the more prominent legislative acts that pertain to the
distribution of audio and video works.30 Part IV analyzes recent case
law, and Part V argues that a balance must be accorded between
copyright owners and the distribution of their works.
II. THE MEANS BEHIND THE DIGITAL DISTRIBUTION OF AUDIO
WORKS
Music can be transmitted over the Internet in two methods, either
through audio streaming, which is somewhat analogous to radio
28
Supra note 17. See also responses to Valenti’s article at the Electronic Frontier
Foundation (EFF), at http://www.eff.org and http://www.eff.org/IP/Video (last visited Nov.
2000).
29
See Note, Visual Artists’ Rights in a Digital Age, 107 HARV. L. REV. 1977, 1991
(June 1994).
30
One legislative act that this note will not review more thoroughly is the No Electronic
Theft (“NET”) Act. See Pub. L. No. 105-147, 111 Stat. 2678. Enacted in December of
1997, the NET Act introduced a number of changes to titles 17 and 18 of the U.S. Code that
essentially reversed the decision in United States v. LaMacchia, 871 F. Supp. 535 (D. Mass.
1994). Under the NET Act, computer-based infringement of copyrighted material is now
subject to criminal prosecution. This is so regardless of whether the defendant derives a
direct financial benefit from the acts of misappropriation. Thus, persons pirating audio
and/or video works over the Internet may now be prosecuted as criminals under the NET
Act.
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broadcasting, or through MP3 files, which are downloaded and may
be played repeatedly, similar to CD’s or tapes.31 Traditionally, only
performances of music made available to a public audience have
been subject to copyright law.32 However, the American Society of
Composers, Authors and Publishers (hereinafter “ASCAP”) has, to
date, successfully argued that every transmission of music on the
Internet constitutes a public performance.33 ASCAP has argued that
the public audience for a sound recording transmitted over the
Internet does not need to be located in one place, or even one time.34
Since music on the Internet can often be downloaded at the
convenience of the listener, it need not be broadcast to several
listeners at a given time in order to constitute a performance.35 It is
enough that a substantial number of listeners will, over time, access
the recording.36 Thus, copyright law applies to all forms of music
transmitted over the Internet.

31

See Internet & Wireless Transmission: Music on the Web, at
http://www.riaa.org/Audio_Media_2.cfm (last visited Oct. 2001). Audio streaming, also
known as webcasting, is the continuous playing of music in real time broadcasts over the
Internet. Listeners to webcasts, much like in television and radio, listen to webcasts as they
are broadcast. MP3 files, on the other hand, are downloaded by a user for repeated listening
at his convenience, more like the playing use of CD’s, tapes, and records. Once an MP3 file
is downloaded it can be listened to fully independent of the source of the downloaded file.
32
See 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1994) for a definition of public performance: “To perform or
display the ‘copyrighted work publicly’ means: (a) to perform or display it at a place open to
the public or where a substantial number of persons are gathered, (b) to transmit or
otherwise communicate a performance or display of the work to a place specified by clause
(a) above or to the public, by means of any device or process.”
33
See Comments of the American Society of Composers, Authors and Publishers on the
Preliminary Draft of the Report of the Working Group on Intellectual Property Rights,
submitted and filed with the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office on September 7, 1994
(Comments filed on behalf of Marilyn Bergman, President, ASCAP, on the Green Paper by
the Working Group on Intellectual Property Rights and the National Information
Infrastructure); Hearing on H.R. 2441 Before the Subcomm. on Courts and Intellectual
Prop., 104th Cong. (1996) (statement of Frances W. Preston, President and CEO, Broadcast
Music, Inc.) available at http://www.house.gov/judiciary/462.htm (last visited Oct. 2001).
34
See id.
35
See id.
36
See id.
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A. Audio Streaming
Audio streaming is the live flow of music in digital form over the
Internet by an Internet Service Provider (hereinafter “ISP”).37 Audio
streaming is somewhat analogous to radio broadcasting in that music
is broadcast over the Internet for immediate listening.38 Much like
radio, music transmitted in audio streams is presently inferior in
quality to that of a CD.39 Nevertheless, the technology is likely to
improve to the point where streaming audio can be broadcast and
subsequently recorded while retaining the quality of a conventional
CD.40
B. MP3 Downloads of Individual Computer Files
Individual computer files, on the other hand, are copies of music
that are near to the quality of CD’s.41 Individual files are compressed
recordings of music that occupy only a small amount of memory on a
computer.42 Some formats for these recordings are MP3, a2b,

37
See Business 2.0: Glossary, at http://www.business2.com/glossary/1,1652,S,FF.html
(last visited Oct. 2001).
38
On Dec. 11, 2000 the Copyright Office came out with a new ruling concerning the
broadcast of music over the Internet via audio streaming and webcasting. See 37 C.F.R. §
201 (2000).
39
Heather D. Rafter, William Sloan Coats, Vickie L. Feeman & John G. Given,
Streaming into the Future: Music and Video Online, 611 PLI/Pat 395 at 400 (2000).
40
See Bob Godwin Jones, Emerging Technologies: Real-time Audio and Video
Playback on the Web, Language Learning & Technology, July 1997, at 5, at
http://polyglot.cal.msu.edu/111+/volinum1/emerging.htm (last visited Oct. 2001).
41
See MP3 & Real Audio How-to, at http://www.salon.com/audio/2000/10/02/help/
(last visited Oct. 2001).
42
MP3 files compress music by utilizing audio coding and psychoacoustic compression
to remove redundant and irrelevant parts of a sound signal that the human ear, for the most
part, does not hear. However, compression algorithms are not perfect and may result in a
degradation of the sound quality of the music, most notable to those with highly trained
ears. MP3 files accomplish compression by reducing the bit rate for music of 1411.2 kbps
of stereo music by a factor of 10 to 14 down to 112-128 kbps. For example, under normal
conditions an uncompressed three-minute song will take up approximately 32 megabytes of
space. By reducing the bit rate, MP3 compression reduces the amount of space needed
down to approximately 3 megabytes of space. For further information, see How MP3 Files
Work, at http://www.howstuffworks.com/mp3.htm (last visited Mar. 2001).
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RealAudio, and LiquidAudio files.43 Of these formats, MP3, which
was originally created for the purpose of compressing motion picture
files, has become the most popular.44 MP3 files download much
faster than the uncompressed .wav (“wave”) files that they replaced
and cut download times from up to two hours to less than five or ten
minutes per song.45 Nonetheless, MP3 files occupy only a fraction
of the space of .wav files on a hard drive, thereby making them
highly desirable in an age where hard drive memory is available at a
relatively low cost.46
C. File-sharing: Napster and Gnutella Facilitate the Widespread
Downloading of MP3 Files.
File-sharing software, available over the Internet, makes it easy to
download and thereby distribute music on the Internet in mass levels
at no cost to the user, often without providing for compensation to
copyright owners for the widespread distribution of their musical
works.47 File-sharing is available free of charge to the user via
various websites, such that persons who have downloaded the
necessary software can log-on to the Internet and share MP3 music
files with other users who are simultaneously logged on to the
system.48 Napster, a start-up company based in San Mateo,
California, and the less user-friendly Gnutella, were among the first
43

See Neil J. Rosini & Howard M. Singer, Music and The Internet 1. Technologies
Used In Delivering Music On The Net 2. Summary Of Online Rights, Sources, and Licenses
Under Copyright For Music and Sound Recordings 3. Online and Summary Of The Digital
Performance Right In Sound Recordings Act Of 1995 As Amended By The Digital
Millennium Copyright Act Of 1998 4. ASCAP Experimental License Agreement For Internet
Sites On The World Wide Web—Release 2.0 5. BMI Web Site Music Performance
Agreement 6. Music Download Questionnaire, 545 PLI/Pat 865, 870-71 (Jan. 1999).
44
See Whit Andrews, Downloadable Files Hit Mainstream, INTERNET WORLD, Apr. 12,
1999. Incidentally, MP3 stands for Motion Picture Experts Group (“MPEG”) one layer
three.
45
Supra note 42, at http://www.howstuffworks.com/mp3.htm (last visited Mar. 2001).
46
Id.
47
Supra note 13, at 1779. Some other popular file swapping services are Freenet and
Aimster. See John Borland, File-Swapping Aimster to Tap Into ICQ, Napster, at
http://www.news.cnet.com/news/0-1005-200-2776806.html (last visited Dec. 2000).
48
For a listing of file-sharing services, visit http://www.zeropaid.com (last visited Dec.
2000). See also supra note 47.
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to offer file-sharing services and have received much press recently
in light of recent litigation against Napster.49
File-sharing services such as Napster provide “peer-to-peer” (also
known as P2P) file-sharing over the Internet.50 Peer-to-peer filesharing, made possible through particular software applications,
allows account holders to conduct relatively sophisticated searches
for music files containing songs from their favorite artists on the hard
drives of millions of other anonymous users.51 Thus, Napster’s peerto-peer filing system, which is run from a centralized location,
Napster’s website, connects users to one another and facilitates the
searching and downloading of music files.52
How do music files get onto the Internet in the first place?
Converting music from a standard CD into MP3 format for
distribution via Napster or Gnutella is a simple process. The
required software is available at no cost from many sources,
including Napster.53 The software allows users to “rip”, or copy, a
song from a CD and convert it into MP3 format. Once the music is
in MP3 format, it can easily be uploaded onto the Napster system
and is available for others to copy at their discretion. Furthermore,
once a sound recording has been uploaded onto the Internet, it can be
downloaded by millions of users with little to no sound
degradation.54 Unlike tapes or photocopies, even a fifth or one-

49
See How Napster Works, at http://www.howstuffworks.com/napster4.htm (last visited
Mar. 2001). See also A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 2000 WL 1170106, at *1 (N.D.
Cal. 2000).
50
See How Napster Works, at http://www.howstuffworks.com/napster4.htm (last visited
Mar. 2001).
51
See A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 114 F. Supp. 2d 896 (N.D. Cal. 2000) (citing
Def.’s Mot. for Summ. J.) [hereinafter Napster I].
52
John Borland, File-Swapping Aimster to Tap into ICQ, Napster, CNET News.com,
September 14, 2000, at http://news.cnet.com/news/0-1005-200-2776806.html (last visited
Oct. 2001). Gnutella is very similar to Napster in its ability to allow users to share files, but
differs primarily in that file-sharing software for Gnutella shifts from computer to computer
and is not run primarily from any one website or location.
53
See supra note 8. Visit http://www.zeropaid.com for other sources that provide the
necessary software for uploading music (last visited Sept. 2001).
54
See How MP3 Files Work, at http://www.howstuffworks.com (last visited Mar.
2001).
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thousandth generation copy of an MP3 sound recording will be
virtually identical to the original.55
III. LEGISLATION: THE BATTLE BEGINS
The recording industry has always been concerned with the
consumer’s ability to copy and distribute music without
compensation to recording artists.56 Before the creation of the
Internet, the technology that first enabled the consumer to make his
own copies of music came with the commercial exploitation of
magnetic tapes.57 Although the first magnetic tape recorder was
developed in 1898, it wasn’t until the middle of the twentieth century
that tape recorders became a commercially viable product.58 For the
55
Tamber Christian, Internet Caching: Something to Think About, 67 UMKC L. REV.
477 (1999) (stating that unlike copying from cassette, materials copied from the Internet
retain the same high quality as the original and do not decrease in quality with each
additional copy made).
56
In 1908 musicians and composers began lobbying Congress for protection from the
uncompensated distribution of their works following on the heels of the first U.S. court
decision concerning the copying of music. See White-Smith Music Pub. Co. v. Apollo Co.,
290 U.S. 1 (1908), holding that perforated rolls of paper used in automatic player pianos to
play musical compositions are not copies of musical compositions and therefore do not
infringe upon the rights of copyright owners. As a result of their lobbying, mechanical
compulsory licenses were introduced into U.S. copyright law for the first time in the 1909
Copyright Act. Soon after, in 1914, ASCAP was founded by Irving Berlin, among other
musicians, as a performing rights society to protect musicians’ rights.
57
For some very informative websites detailing the history of sound recording,
including the introduction into the marketplace of magnetic tapes and digital recording
equipment,
see
Steve
Schoenherr,
Recording
Technology
History,
at
http://history.acusd.edu/gen/recording/notes.html (last visited Mar. 2001); Jones
Telecommunications & Multimedia Encyclopedia Audio Recording: History and
Development, at http://www.digitalcentury.com/encyclo/update/audiohd.html (last visited
Mar.
2001);
and
Sound
Recording
History,
at
http://www.inventors.about.com/science/inventors/library/inventors/blsoundrecording.htm?t
erms=phonograph (last visited Mar. 2001).
58
See Sound Recording History, at
http://inventors.about.com/library/inventors/blsoundrecording.htm (last visited Nov. 2001).
The first magnetic recording device was invented by Valdemar Poulsen in 1898. Poulsen’s
device recorded sound onto magnetized steel piano wire. Prior to the invention of Poulsen’s
magnetic recording device, Thomas Edison created the first recording medium, the cylinder
phonograph, in 1877. The first magnetic tape recording device was created during World
War II by Joseph Begun. See
http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/ac/ahrpa/opa/pulse/9807.htm (last visited Nov. 2001).
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first time, during the 1960’s, consumers could buy tape recorders and
make recordings of music at their own discretion.59 Still, the
recording technology remained imperfect.60 Tape recordings did not
fully and accurately capture the essence of musical works.61 Since
successive copies of tapes tended to degrade in sound quality even
further, the consumer’s ability to distribute music to others was very
limited, ensuring the need for consumers to purchase originals of the
sound recordings.62
However, in the late 1980’s manufacturers of recording devices
developed the digital audio tape (hereinafter “DAT”), which was the
first technology to permit consumers to make perfect copies of sound
recordings.63 At the time of its development, much like the invention
of MP3 files, the invention of the DAT concerned the music
industry.64 DAT enabled a consumer to make perfect copies of
music and then distribute the copies to others.65 In turn, these people
could then make perfect copies of their copies to distribute to yet
more people, and so on down the line without ever compensating the
recording artists for what may inevitably be mass distribution of the
musical work.66

59
See
Steve
Schoenherr,
Recording
Technology
History,
at
http://history.acusd.edu/gen/recording/notes.html (last visited Nov. 2001).
Philips
introduced its first compact audio cassette in 1963, which sold the next year in the U.S.
along with the Norelco Carry-Corder dictation machine. At about the same time, the eight
track recording medium also made its debut.
60
See William Sloan Coats, et al., PLI’s Sixth Annual Institute for Intellectual Property
Law: Streaming Into the Future: Music and Video Online, 616 PLI/Pat 149, 164 (2000).
61
See H.R. REP. NO. 104-274, at 12 (1995) (stating that consumers have embraced
digital recordings because of their superior sound quality).
62
See Christopher Yang & William W. Fisher III, Peer-to-Peer Copying (Berkman
Center for Internet & Society at Harvard Law School 2001), at
http://con.law.harvard.edu/ilaw/P2P/ (stating that records and cassettes are subject to wear
and tear, and multiple generation copies often suffer from poor quality, thereby reducing the
threat of large scale high quality piracy).
63
See supra note 60.
64
See H.R. REP. NO. 102-873, pt. 2, at 2 (1992).
65
See id.
66
See id.
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A. The Audio Home Recording Act of 1992
In response to the invention of DAT technology, the record labels
joined together in worldwide negotiations in 1987.67 Two years
later, after extensive lobbying to gain support from other factions in
the music industry, such as music publishers, songwriters, and the
performing rights societies, the music industry banded together to
lobby Congress for additional copyright protection.68 Congress,
hearing the plea of the music industry, passed the Audio Home
Recording Act (hereinafter “AHRA”) into legislation in October of
1992.69
The AHRA strikes a balance between the owners of copyrights in
sound recordings and the manufacturers of recording equipment.70
On the one hand, it provides manufacturers and distributors of digital
and analog audio recording devices protection from copyright
infringement actions and thereby promotes the sale of digital and
analog recording devices.71 However, in exchange for the limitations
that this places upon the music industry, the AHRA requires
manufacturers and distributors of digital audio recording devices and
media (hereinafter “DART”) that are imported to or distributed in the
U.S. to contribute to a royalty fund deposited with the Register of
Copyrights.72
The royalties from the DART fund provide
compensation to recording artists, copyright owners, and music
publishers that hold copyrights in sound recordings.73

67

See id.; see also supra note 60.
See supra note 60, at 165.
69
Audio Home Recording Act of 1992, Pub. L. No. 102-563, § 1623, 106 Stat. 4237
(1992).
70
See supra note 63, at 165. See H.R. REP. No. 104-274 (1995) (describing background
and need for legislation).
71
17 U.S.C. § 1008 (1994).
72
See Recent Development In the Legislature/In the Agencies Copyright: Copyright
Office Modifies CARP Distribution Order, 9 No. 4 JPROPR 34 (1997); see also 17 U.S.C.
§§ 1003-1004 (1994).
73
See 17 U.S.C. § 1006 (1994).
68
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1. Distribution of the DART Fund
Prior to allocating money to individual claimants, the DART fund
is divided into Sound Recording Funds, Musical Works Funds and
their respective sub-funds.74 Payments from the Sound Recording
Funds and the Musical Works Funds are subsequently distributed to
interested claimants pursuant to a negotiated settlement or a
distribution order by the Library of Congress following a distribution
proceeding by a Copyright Arbitration Royalty Panel (hereinafter
“CARP”).75 In the absence of a negotiated settlement, the AHRA
establishes the percentages for each fund and sub-fund, and directs
the CARP’s to determine the appropriate distribution amounts to
which each claimant is entitled.76
The distribution of DART funds occurs in two phases. In Phase I
of the distribution process, royalties from the funds are apportioned
among eight classes of claimants.77 In Phase II, awards are then
made to individual copyright owners within each of the classes.78 If,
at either phase, a controversy arises regarding the appropriate
disposition of all or a portion of the royalties, the Librarian convenes
74

Id.
Id.
76
Id. For more information on the royalty rates established by the AHRA, see DONALD
PASSMAN, ALL YOU NEED TO KNOW ABOUT THE MUSIC BUSINESS (1997).
77
See Distribution of 1990, 1991, and 1992 Cable Royalties, 61 Fed. Reg. 55, 655 (Oct.
28, 1996). The eight classes have traditionally been the: (1) Program Suppliers, which are
the copyright owners of syndicated television series, movies, and television specials; (2)
Joint Sports Claimants, which are the copyright owners of live telecasts of professional and
college team sports; (3) National Association of Broadcasters (also known as “Commercial
Television”), which are the copyright owners of programs—typically news and local interest
programs—produced by broadcast stations; (4) Public Broadcasting Service (also known as
“Noncommercial Television”), which are the copyright owners of all programming
broadcast by the Public Broadcasting Service that do not fall within another category; (5)
Devotional Claimants, which are copyright owners of syndicated programs with a religious
theme that do not fall within another category; (6) Canadian Claimants, which are the
copyright owners of programs broadcast on Canadian stations that do not fall within another
category; (7) Music Claimants, which are the copyright owners of musical works broadcast
on all programming, as represented by the performing rights societies ASCAP, BMI and
SESAC; and (8) National Public Radio, representing the copyright owners of all programs
broadcast on National Public Radio stations that do not fall within the Music Claimants
category.
78
See id.
75
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a CARP to propose a settlement.79 For example, in a Phase II
proceeding within the Music Claimants class, the copyright owners
represented by ASCAP may be in controversy with the copyright
owners represented by BMI as to the division of royalties allotted to
the Music Claimants category after the conclusion of the Phase I
proceeding.80 If such a controversy exists, the Librarian would
conduct a Phase II proceeding under the same provisions of the
Copyright Act applicable to the Phase I proceeding.81
2. Serial Copyright Management System
The AHRA also requires that each DAT device incorporate a copy
control mechanism, either the Serial Copy Management System
(hereinafter “SCMS”) or any other system certified by the Secretary
of Commerce as prohibiting unauthorized serial copying.82 This
provision protects copyright owners from an economic loss by
preventing subsequent copies of a musical work that would
otherwise result in an unlimited amount of permissible copies of their
works. The AHRA allows unlimited first generation copies of music
to be made from the original recording, but prevents recording a
copy from a copy.83
3. An Exemption for Computer Hard Drives
Notably, however, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals in
Recording Indus. Ass’n of Am. v. Diamond Multimedia has
interpreted the AHRA as wholly exempting computer hard drives
and MP3 files copied onto computer hard drives from its
provisions.84 Prior to the Ninth Circuit’s decision, the AHRA
79

See id.
Id.
81
17 U.S.C. § 801-803 (1994).
82
Id. at § 1002 (1994).
83
138 CONG. REC. H9029 at 9043 (daily ed. Sept. 22, 1992).
84
180 F.3d 1072, 1078 (9th Cir. 1999) [hereinafter Diamond II]. See discussion infra
Part IV(A). Some have argued that the Ninth Circuit’s determination does not conform with
80
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already exempted professional devices such as dictation machines,
answering machines, and other recording devices whose “primary
purpose” is the fixation of non-musical sounds.85 In its decision, the
Ninth Circuit extended this exemption to include computer hard
drives, stating that the primary purpose of a computer is not to make
digital recordings of music and therefore, the AHRA does not govern
the copying of music files to and from computer hard drives.86 The
Ninth Circuit, citing 17 U.S.C. § 1008, asserted that such a result was
in keeping with the underlying purpose of the AHRA to allow
consumers to make copies of audio recordings for their private,
noncommercial use.87 Furthermore, citing Sony Corp. v. Universal
Studios, Inc., where time-shifting by users of home video recorders
was held to be fair use, the Ninth Circuit suggested that the MP3
player in question, the Rio player, merely performs the equally
innocuous function of “space-shifting” music from a computer’s hard
drive into a portable player.88
B. The Digital Performance Right in Sound Recordings Act of 1995
Although the AHRA may have created an effective balance
between manufacturers of recording equipment and the music
industry, as noted above, it did not sufficiently address music
distributed through computers via the Internet.89 Moreover, the
the underlying purpose of the AHRA and that the drafters of the AHRA did not intend to
exclude music fixed on computer hard drives from the definition of digital musical
recording under the AHRA. See Brendan M. Schulman, The Song Heard ‘Round the
World: The Copyright Implications of MP3s and the Future of Digital Music, 12 HARV. J.L.
& TECH. 589, 608-10 (1999); Alex Alleman, Manifestation of an AHRA Malfunction: The
Uncertain Status of MP3 Under Recording Industry Association of America v. Diamond
Multimedia Systems, Inc., 79 TEX. L. REV. 189 (2000).
85
17 U.S.C. § 1001(3)(B).
86
See Diamond II, 180 F.3d at 1077.
87
17 U.S.C. § 1008 (exempting, among other instances, the noncommercial copying of
music from the bounds of the AHRA). See Diamond II, 180 F.3d at 1079.
88
See Diamond II, 180 F.3d at 1079. See also infra Part IV(A) and Sony Corp. v.
Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 455 (1984) (holding to be fair use the “timeshifting” of copyrighted material by VCR’s, allowing VCR owners to tape programs for
later viewing).
89
Current copyright law is inadequate to address all of the issues raised by these new
technologies dealing with the digital transmission of sound recordings and musical works
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AHRA, and prior copyright law concerning recording artists,
primarily addressed the musician’s need to protect against the
uncompensated physical distribution of albums, in the form of
records, tapes, and CD’s, and not the digital distribution of music
over the Internet.90 Copyright law prior to the creation of the
Internet, including the Sound Recording Act Amendment of 1971
(granting musicians copyright protection in sound recordings),91 the
1976 Copyright Act,92 and the AHRA, could not have anticipated the
growth of the Internet and the distribution of sound recordings
thereof.
Nevertheless, researchers estimate that Internet sales of music
represented 2.4% of all sales in the music industry for the year 2000,
which may grow to 25% of revenues (totaling $1.25 billion) by the
year 2005.93 Important to the music industry, the advent of the
Internet began a shift in sales away from the physical sale of albums
toward the digital distribution of music, leaving artists without
legislation supporting their need for compensation from music
distributed over the new medium.94 In response to the shift away
from physical album sales, Congress enacted the Digital
Performance Right in Sound Recordings Act of 1995 (hereinafter
“DPRA”).95

and, thus, to protect the livelihoods of the recording artists, songwriters, record companies,
music publishers and others who depend upon revenues derived from traditional record
sales. In particular, recording artists and record companies cannot be effectively protected
unless copyright law recognizes at least a limited performance right in sound recordings.
See supra note 7, at 579-82.
90
See id. at 580-81.
91
Pub. L. No. 92-140, 85 Stat. 391 (1971).
92
17 U.S.C. § 106.
93
Laura Carr, Net Music Sales Are Still Ringing, The Standard, August 21, 2000, at
http://www.thestandard.com/research/metrics/display/0,2799,17774,00.html (last visited
Nov. 2000).
94
S. REP. No. 104-128 (1995). See also June Chung, The Digital Performance Right in
Sound Recordings Act and Its Failure to Address the Issue of Digital Music’s New Form of
Distribution, 39 ARIZ. L. REV. 1361, 1365 (1997).
95
Pub. L. No. 104-39, 109 Stat. 336 (1995).
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1. Recording Artists Need Digital Performance Rights.
Traditionally, sound recordings have included two distinct
copyrights: a copyright in the underlying musical composition to be
performed on a recording and a copyright in the physical sound
recording itself.96 Generally, the songwriter, composer, or his
designated music publisher owns the copyright in the underlying
musical composition, which includes a performance right, and the
record label (which pays royalties to the recording artist) owns the
copyright in the sound recording, which has not traditionally
included a performance right.97 Since radio stations have not
traditionally had to pay for a performance right to broadcast music,
when a song is played on the radio the owner of the copyright in the
musical composition receives compensation for a performance of his
music, but the record label, the artists, and their producers do not
receive compensation.98 For example, Madonna recorded the song
“American Pie” composed by Don McLean. However, unless the
parties have specifically negotiated a supervening agreement, only
Don McLean receives royalties for the radio station’s performance of
the music because he, or his designated music publisher, owns the
underlying copyright in the music. Madonna receives royalties only
from the sale of physical copies of the recording in the form of CD’s,
tapes, and records and does not receive compensation directly from
the broadcast.
Perhaps one reason why performance rights were not granted prior
to the DPRA is the status quo in radio broadcasting. Radio stations
have argued since well before the advent of the Internet that they
provide free advertisement for recording artists through
performances of an artist’s works during radio broadcasts.99 Their
96

See Bob Kohn, A Primer On The Law of Webcasting and Digital Music Delivery, 20
No. 4 ENT. L. REP. 4 (1998).
97
See id.; see also supra note 32 (defining “performance” of a musical work).
98
See Bob Kohn, A Primer On The Law of Webcasting and Digital Music Delivery, 20
No. 4 ENT. L. REP. 4 (1998).
99
See Whitmark v. Bamberger, 291 F. 776 (D.C.N.J. 1923); Stuart Talley, Performance
Rights in Sound Recordings: Is There Justification In The Age Of Digital Broadcasting?, 28
BEVERLY HILLS BAR ASS’N J. 79, 85 (1994); see also Jeffrey A. Abrahamson, Tuning Up
For A New Musical Age: Sound Recording Copyright Protection in a Digital Environment,
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argument is that free advertisement popularizes a recording artist’s
music and induces further sales of his albums, for which the artist
will receive compensation.100 Therefore, because recording artists
will receive compensation from increased album sales, the radio
stations argue that they should not have to further compensate
recording artists by paying for a performance right to broadcast
music.101 Historically the reasoning of the radio broadcasters has
been a matter of controversy and undergone severe criticism,
including a report by the Register of Copyrights suggesting that
Congress should grant “a performance right to the copyright owners
of sound recordings.”102 Congress, however, chose not to address
the granting of performing rights until the passage of the DPRA into
legislation.103 Moreover, under the traditional regime, radio stations
have not had to pay for a performance right for analog broadcasts of
music and recording artists have had to rely upon compensation only
from the physical sale of CD’s, tapes, and records.104
However, with the rapid expansion of the Internet, recording artists
have an increasing need for performance rights because the digital
distribution of music, in the form of MP3 files, has disrupted the
recording artists’ ability to receive royalties from physical album
sales.105 The introduction of the Internet has begun the shift away
25 AIPLA Q.J. 181, 183 (1997).
100
See Talley, supra note 99.
101
See id. It should be noted that although radio stations have been successful in
lobbying against compensating artists for analog broadcasts of music, radio stations have
not been as successful in lobbying against compensating artists for digital webcasts of
music. In December of 2000, the Copyright Office, with perhaps questionable authority,
took the position that radio stations are not exempt from copyright owners’ digital
performance rights in sound recordings for music broadcast over the Internet. See Public
Performance
of
Sound
Recordings:
Definition
of
a
Service,
at
http://www.loc.gov/copyright/fedreg/2000/65fr77292.pdf (last visited Nov.
2001).
Regulations set forth by the Copyright Office further defining “broadcast transmissions” for
the purposes of 17 U.S.C. § 114 would require radio stations to pay a statutory fee for a
compulsory license to broadcast music over the Internet or negotiate with the artists for a
license. Id. See also 17 U.S.C. § 115. At least one court has upheld the determination of
the Copyright Office and granted summary judgment against the radio stations. See
Bonneville Int’l Corp. v. Peters, 153 F. Supp. 2d 763 (E.D. Pa. 2001).
102
Talley, supra note 99, at 85.
103
Id.
104
17 U.S.C. § 114(d)(1)(A) (1994 & Supp. V 1999).
105
See David Balaban, Music in the Digital Millennium: The Effects of the Digital
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from the physical distribution of music toward the digital distribution
of musical works.106 Whereas sales of music are reportedly up 20%
overall in the last two years, a study by Michael Fine, CEO of
SoundScan, indicates that sales near college areas where Napster has
been widespread are down 4%.107 This could have exponential
effects upon the music industry as the younger generations, more apt
to acquire music over the Internet, begin to displace the older
generations as the major purchasers of music.
Moreover, although the transmission of music over the Internet
disrupted the established arrangement for compensating musicians,
prior to the enactment of the DPRA recording artists did not have a
performance right in music transmitted over the Internet to reflect the
shift in the distribution of music from a physical medium to a digital
medium. Not only could a recording artist’s music be distributed
easily via the Internet to many potential consumers, displacing the
artist’s album sales, but existing legislation did not support
compensating the artist for Internet transmissions of his works.
2. Provisions of the DPRA
Acknowledging that the transmission of music over the Internet
could cause a shift away from the sale of physical copies of music
toward the digital distribution of music, Congress granted musicians
a digital performance right in sound recordings.108 In November
1995, President Clinton signed into law the DPRA, which amended
§§ 106 and 114 of the Copyright Act and, for the first time,
Millennium Copyright Act of 1998, 7 UCLA ENT. L. REV. 311 (1998).
106
See John Borland & Rachel Konrad, Study Finds Napster Use May Cut Into Record
Sales, CNET News.com, May 25, 2000, at http://news.cnet.com/news/0-1005-2001945948.html (last visited Aug. 2001). For background information on SoundScan, see
generally supra note 60, at 161. SoundScan measures how many records are sold at retail.
This information is used for Billboard’s charts.
107
Id. One reason for the displacement of physical album sales may be that
transmissions of MP3 files always result in a perfect additional copy of the music being
created and distributed to a new listener. Compare this to radio where a listener merely has
the option to make a tape recording of a radio broadcast that will invariably suffer in sound
quality due to the broadcast mechanism. See supra note 28.
108
Digital Performance Right in Sound Recordings Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-39,
109 Stat. 336 (1995) (codified as amended at 17 U.S.C. §§ 106(6), 114 (1995)).
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attempted to give musicians limited protection in sound recordings
performed over the Internet.109 The DPRA was the first act to
specifically address the implications of digital transmissions of
music.110 It increased protection for owners of sound recording
copyrights in order to compensate for the shift in the distribution of
music from physical to digital recordings.111
Specifically, the DPRA extended the rights of recording artists to
include “digital phonorecord deliveries” and granted, under § 106(6),
a new “exclusive right to perform the copyrighted work publicly by
means of a digital audio transmission.”112 Digital phonorecord
deliveries, under the DPRA, include all transmissions, such as
transmissions of MP3 files that result in a specifically identifiable
reproduction of music.113
Furthermore, the DPRA extends
performing rights to include some transmissions that may not
typically result in a digital phonorecord delivery.114
Of those transmissions that do not result in a digital phonorecord
delivery, the DPRA distinguishes between interactive and noninteractive services to determine which transmissions are required to
be licensed.115 An interactive service is one that enables a member
of the public to receive, on request, a transmission of a particular
sound recording chosen by or on behalf of the recipient.116 Services
such as audio-on-demand, pay-per-listen, and celestial jukebox
transmissions are all examples of interactive services.117 Interactive
services must be licensed under the DPRA because Congress felt that
109

See 17 U.S.C. §§ 106(6), 114 (1994 & Supp. V 1999).
June Chung, The Digital Performance Right in Sound Recordings Act and Its Failure
to Address the Issue of Digital Music’s New Form of Distribution, 39 ARIZ. L. REV. 1361,
1365 (1997). See Pub. L. No. 104-39, 109 Stat. 336 (1995).
111
See H.R. REP. NO. 104-274 (1995) (describing background and need for legislation).
112
See Nancy A. Bloom, Protecting Copyright Owners of Digital Music—No More Free
Access to Cyber Tunes, 45 JOURNAL OF THE COPYRIGHT SOCIETY OF THE U.S.A. 179, 200
(1997). See also 17 U.S.C. § 115(d) (1995).
113
See Pub. L. No. 104-39, 109 Stat. 336 (1995). See also 17 U.S.C. § 115 (1994 &
Supp. V 1999).
114
See supra note 72.
115
See 17 U.S.C. § 114(d) (1994 & Supp. V 1999).
116
See H.R. REP. NO. 104-274 (1995).
117
David Nimmer, Ignoring The Public, Part I: On the Absurd Complexity of the Digital
Audio Transmission Right, 7 UCLA ENT. L. REV. 189, 246 (2000).
110
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a consumer who is given the option to listen to a song at his
convenience might have little reason to purchase that song in a
store.118 Therefore, interactive services were thought to be likely to
displace physical album sales.
Concerning non-interactive services, those with transmissions that
do not result in a digital phonorecord delivery yet are not part of an
interactive service, there are two types: subscription transmissions
and non-subscription transmissions (to be discussed below).119 A
subscription transmission is one that is controlled and limited to
particular recipients, and for which the recipients must pay
consideration.120 Because Congress felt that some subscription
services were more likely to displace physical album sales than
others, subscription transmissions are further subdivided into two
categories: (i) voluntary subscription transmissions and (ii)
compulsory subscription transmissions.121
Both types of subscription transmissions require licenses from the
owner of the copyrights in the sound recordings, typically record
companies.122 However, the payment scheme is different for each of
the two types of subscription licenses.123 For voluntary subscription
transmissions, the record companies are free to proscribe all
applicable fees or to decline to license the music at all.124 For
compulsory subscription transmissions that satisfy the requirements
of § 114, the record companies are subject to compulsory licensing at
a statutory fee that serves as a maximum amount charged.125
Meanwhile, non-subscription broadcasts do not require licenses
under the DPRA.126 Non-subscription transmissions are defined to
include any transmission that is not a subscription transmission.127
118
119
120
121
122
123
124
125
126
127

See H.R. REP. NO. 104-274 (1995).
See 17 U.S.C. § 114(d).
See H.R. REP. NO. 104-274 (1995). See also S. REP. NO. 104-128 (1995).
See H.R. REP. NO. 104-274 (1995).
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
See H.R. REP. NO. 104-274 (1995).
Id.
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Whereas Congress felt that the risk of a music service that consumers
pay for on a subscription basis poses a moderate to high risk of
replacing the sales of records, Congress also felt that transmissions
that are on a non-subscription basis, like traditional style radio
broadcasts over the internet, posed only a low risk of replacing
record sales.128 While the Copyright Office has since taken a
somewhat contrary position, as originally enacted non-subscription
broadcast transmissions by radio and television stations were
exempted from licensing under the DPRA unless they were part of
an interactive service.129
The classification of a transmission as an interactive, subscription,
or non-subscription service determines whether the license should
fall under a statutory compulsory rate, or must be individually
negotiated and administered.130 For example, for a non-interactive
subscription service fulfilling the requirements of the DPRA, where
the end user downloading the music is required to pay for
transmission of a sound recording, the provider of the download to
the user must pay a licensing fee.131 However, non-interactive
services, such as desktop broadcast sites that automatically play a
sound recording, may be exempt from digital public performance
fees.132 Moreover, interactive services, such as a website that
delivers sound recordings on demand, must negotiate a nonexclusive license fee for the transmission of music.133

128

Id.
Id. See supra note 101. Regulations set forth by the Copyright Office in December
2000 further define “broadcast transmissions” for the purposes of 17 U.S.C. § 114 to require
radio stations to pay a statutory fee for a compulsory license to broadcast music over the
internet or negotiate with the artists for a license. Id.; See 17 U.S.C. § 115. At least one
court has upheld the determination of the Copyright Office and granted summary judgment
against the radio stations. See Bonneville Int’l Corp v. Peters, 153 F.Supp.2d. 763 (E.D.
Pa. 2001).
130
See H.R. REP. NO. 104-274 (1995).
131
Id.
132
17 U.S.C. § 114(d) (1994 & Supp. V 1999). See Nancy A. Bloom, Protecting
Copyright Owners of Digital Music—No More Free Access to Cyber Tunes, 45 JOURNAL OF
THE COPYRIGHT SOCIETY OF THE U.S.A. 179 (1997).
133
See Bloom, supra note 112, at 200.
129
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3. The DPRA: A Watered Down Version of the Performance
Right
Notably, because the DPRA represents a compromise between the
recording industry and radio broadcasters who were largely
concerned with the audio streaming of music, some have argued that
it was so watered down by the time it was passed that its exceptions
override its rules.134 In particular, the act has been criticized for the
limits imposed upon the grant of performance rights.135 Most
notably, as originally enacted the DPRA does not cover most
instances of radio and television broadcasts of music.136 Moreover,
because of lobbying by broadcasters, the DPRA also excludes certain
other services from paying royalties to copyright owners.137
Therefore, it has been argued that the DPRA does not always grant
owners of copyrights in sound recordings protection in situations
where the digital transmission of music may compete with actual
sales of sound recordings.138
C. The Digital Millennium Copyright Act of 1998
Because the DPRA left many gaps in legislation supporting the
enforcement of copyright protection, especially for musical works
over the Internet, Congress implemented the Digital Millennium
Copyright Act (hereinafter “DMCA”) in 1998.139 The DMCA, a
compromise between Internet Service Providers (hereinafter “ISP’s”)
and copyright owners, implements two WIPO treaties and provides

134

Steven V. Podolsky, Chasing the Future: Has the Digital Performance in Sound
Recordings Act of 1995 Kept Pace with Technological Advances in Musical Performance,
or is Copyright Law Lagging Behind?, 21 HASTINGS COMM. & ENT. L.J. 651, 654, 674
(1999).
135
Id. at 674.
136
Id. But see supra note 101.
137
Supra note 134, at 673-74.
138
Id. at 674-75.
139
Digital Millennium Copyright Act, Pub. L. No. 105-304, 112 Stat. 2860 (1998).
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increased protection for copyrighted material transmitted over the
Internet.140
1. The Black Box Provision: Protection Against Technology
Circumvention
One of the most important aspects of the DMCA is that it provides
protection against the circumvention of technological methods
implemented in order to further digital rights management.141 These
requirements, also known as a “black box” provision, provide
important protection for sound recordings by prohibiting the
circumvention of technological methods, such as encryption or
watermarking, which control access to copyrighted works.142
Primarily, the DMCA includes two anti-circumvention provisions
under § 1201(a)(1) and § 1201(a)(2).143 These provisions uphold
encryption and watermarking by requiring that users must not
interfere in any manner with standard “technical measure[s]”
designed to protect or identify copyrighted works.144 Furthermore,
users cannot make available to others any measures developed to
defeat such protections against unauthorized access to works.145
Encryption is like an electronic lock.146 It can prevent persons that
do not have the correct key, or password, from listening to a sound
recording.147 The downside to the encryption of sound recordings is
140

See id.
See David Balaban, Music in the Digital Millennium: The Effects of the Digital
Millennium Copyright Act of 1998, 7 UCLA ENT. L. REV. 311, 320-21 (2000).
142
Id. at 321.
143
Section 1201(a)(1) governs “[t]he act of circumventing a technological protection
measure put in place by a copyright owner to control access to a copyrighted work.” 17
U.S.C. § 1201(a)(1) (1994 & Supp. V 1999). Section 1201(a)(2) supplements the
prohibition against circumvention with prohibitions on creating and making available
certain technologies developed or marketed to defeat technological protections against
unauthorized access to a work. See 17 U.S.C. § 1201(a)(2)(A), (B), (C).
144
See 17 U.S.C. § 1201(a)(1).
145
See 17 U.S.C. § 1201(a)(2).
146
See Rosemarie F. Jones, Wet Footprints? Digital Watermarks: A Trail to the
Copyright Infringer on the Internet, 26 PEPP. L. REV. 559 (1999) (describing encryption as
“longstanding means of protection”).
147
Supra note 141, at 321.
141
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that once the correct password has been found it can be passed on
along with the recording, rendering the encryption useless.
Watermarks, on the other hand, are inaudible additions to music that
inform devices that play music of the authenticity of a recording.148
Watermarks can be used by search engines to determine which sound
recordings are original and which are illegal copies.149 They can also
provide a trail by which owners of sound recordings can trace the
distribution of unauthorized copies throughout the Internet.150
Furthermore, watermarks cannot be removed from a sound recording
without a conspicuous degradation in the quality of the recording.151
It is possible that encryption, watermarking, and other
technological measures used for digital rights management could
provide new, secure methods for the downloading of music.152 This
technology can give the music industry increased control over copies
of music. For example, listeners may be permitted to make a copy of
downloaded music solely for their own use or perhaps to give to a
friend.153 Technology can also make a recording available only for a
limited time period.154 It is conceivable that an industry standard
could be set such that portable players would only play recordings
that contain legitimate watermarks.155
Many organizations,
including AT&T, the originators of a2b, and Liquid Audio have
experimented with secure digital downloading techniques that
incorporate technology that would make this possible.156

148

Id.
Id.
150
Id.
151
Id.
152
See supra note 21, at 871 (discussing copyright protection tools).
153
See RIAA FAQ, at http://www.riaa.com/Music-SDMI-4.cfm (last visited Nov. 2000).
See also SDMI FAQ, at http://www.sdmi.org/FAQ.htm (last visited Nov. 2000).
154
See RIAA FAQ, at http://www.riaa.com/Music-SDMI-4.cfm (last visited Nov. 2000).
155
See id. The Secure Digital Music Initiative [hereinafter “SDMI”], a forum of more
than 160 companies and organizations representing a broad spectrum of information
technology and consumer electronics businesses, is attempting to implement an industrywide watermarking standard for devices that play music. New music to be distributed will
contain watermarks. Compliant devices will be able to play these files, in addition to the
existing MP3 files.
156
See id.
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However, whether security measures such as encryption and
watermarking can be successful in application is a matter of debate.
For example, in September of 2000 the Secure Digital Music
Initiative (hereinafter “SDMI”), a collaboration including the “big
five” record labels and over 160 companies, created for the task of
implementing a form of digital protection architecture over music
files, attempted to create a secure method for protecting copyrighted
music and was met with mixed results.157 After extensive research,
the SDMI consortium developed six protection technologies and
presented them to the hacking community, offering $10,000 as an
incentive to anyone who could break any of the six technologies.158
At first glance the results of the contest seemed promising. The
official position of SDMI was that two of the 447 submissions to the
contest were successful attacks upon a protective technology, but that
only one of the attacks was significant because it could be repeated
on additional pieces of music.159
Still, there are a number of reasons to doubt the success of the
protective technologies.
Computer experts from Princeton
University, Rice University, and Xerox stand by their claim that they
hacked through four of the technologies without significantly
degrading the music.160 They state that they did not submit their
attacks for consideration in the final round of the contest and that
therefore their successful attacks upon the protection systems were
not included as part of the contest results.161 Other experts claim that
watermarks are, by definition, hackable, and that even if the
watermarks in question did survive for a four-week long contest it
157

See http://www.riaa.com/Music-SDMI-4.cfm (last visited Nov. 2000).
See http://www.cs.princeton.edu/sip/sdmi/faq.html (last visited Nov. 2000); see also
The Industry Standard’s Beat Sheet, A Weekly Report on the Convergence of Music and the
Net, at http://www.thestandard.com (Oct. 17, 2000).
159
See SDMI Continues Evaluation of Proposals for Phase II Technologies, at
http://www.sdmi.org/pr/VA_Nov_10_2000_PR.htm (last visited Nov. 2001). See also Sue
Hackers
Win
SDMI
Prize,
at
Zeidler,
Reuters
(Nov.
28,
2000),
http://techtv.com/print/story/0,23102,3013825,00.html (last visited Dec. 2000).
160
See Robert Lemos, Secure Digital Music Hits a Sour Note, ZDNet News (Oct. 23,
2000), at http://www.zdnet.com/zdnn/stories/news/0,4586,2643884,00.html (last visited
Dec. 2000).
161
See Sue Ziedler, Hackers Win SDMI Prize, Reuters (Nov. 28, 2000), at
http://techtv.com/print/story/0,23102,3013825,00.html (last visited Nov. 2001).
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would only be a matter of time before the watermarks or any other
protective technology could be effectively removed.162 A last
segment of the hacking community has argued that in determining
the success of the attacks SDMI overemphasized the sound
degradation of the hacked sound recordings. 163 If this argument has
any basis then it is possible that the average listener might use the
circumvention technologies, even those that did not survive the
contest, to copy encrypted music files without noticing any
degradation in the sound quality of the music.
2. Safe Harbors Limit the Liability of Internet Service Providers.
Although the DMCA attempts to protect copyrighted material
under the black box provision in consideration of ISP’s, it severely
limits the circumstances under which ISP’s can be found liable for
the infringement of sound recordings and does not require them to
police their sites.164 The DMCA, which provides for strict liability
for infringement of copyrights, provides four categories that limit the
These
circumstances under which infringement occurs.165
categories, specified as “safe harbors”, include: 1) Conduit
Functions, 2) System Caching, 3) User Storage, and 4) Information
Location Tools.166
The Conduit Function provision limits an ISP’s liability for routing
sound recordings from one point to another.167 This safe harbor
resolves the discrepancy in case law between Religious Technology
Center v. Netcom and Playboy v. Frena.168 The Court in Netcom
dismissed the possibility of direct or vicarious liability for an ISP
162

Id.
Robert Lemos, Secure Digital Music Hits a Sour Note, ZDNet News, Oct. 23, 2000,
at http://www.zdnet.com/zdnn/stories/0,4586,2643884,00.html (last visited Dec. 2000).
164
See 17 U.S.C. § 512 (1996 & Supp. V 2001).
165
Id.
166
See id.
167
See Carolyn Andrepont, The Digital Millennium Copyright Act of 1998, U.S.
COPYRIGHT OFFICE SUMMARY, Dec. 1998, at 9.
168
See Playboy Enters., Inc. v. Frena, 839 F. Supp. 1552 (M.D. Fla. 1993) and Religious
Tech. Ctr. v. Netcom On-Line Communication Services, Inc., 907 F. Supp. 1361 (N.D. Cal.
1995).
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that provided Internet access for a website that illegally distributed
music over the Internet.169 It held that an ISP is prone only to the
lesser transgression of contributory infringement.170
This
contradicted the Court in Frena, which found direct infringement for
a bulletin board service that, without knowledge of the infringement,
provided Internet access for a subscriber that illegally posted
copyrighted photographs from Playboy onto the Internet.171 Under
the DMCA, a transmission that occurs automatically, without any
selection of material by the ISP, will not subject an ISP to liability.172
This codifies the decision in Netcom and makes it harder to hold an
ISP liable for distributing illegal sound recordings over the
Internet.173
System Caching allows an ISP to make a temporary copy of a
sound recording in order to provide quicker access for its users.174
Courts have not yet addressed the copyright implications of
permitting an ISP to temporarily fix a copy of a sound recording on
its computer system. ISP’s argue that fixation is necessary in order
to speed up usage.175 However, the court in Mai Systems Corp. v.
Peak Computer held that a work fixed in a tangible means of
expression is one that is “sufficiently permanent or stable to permit it
to be perceived, reproduced or otherwise communicated for a period
of more than transitory duration.”176 Using this definition, cached
sound recordings might have been prohibited under the Copyright
Act of 1976.177 However, under the DMCA, an ISP must limit
access to the sound recording to only those people who satisfy the

169

Netcom, 907 F. Supp. at 1372.
Id. at 1375.
171
Frena, 839 F. Supp. at 1559.
172
17 U.S.C. § 512(b)(1)(c) (1996).
173
See Jennifer E. Markiewicz, Seeking Shelter From the MP3 Storm: How Far Does
the Digital Millennium Copyright Act Online Service Provider Liability Limitation Reach?,
7 COMM. LAW CONSPECTUS 423, 436 (Summer 1999).
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See Tamber Christian, Internet Caching: Something to Think About, 67 UMKC L.
REV. 477 (Spring 1999).
175
Id. at 478.
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Mai Systems Corp. v. Peak Computer, 991 F.2d 511, 518 (9th Cir. 1993) (citing 17
U.S.C. § 101 (1976)).
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17 U.S.C. § 101 (1976).
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conditions imposed by the individual who posted the recording.178 If
the conditions are broad, then this may allow persons other than the
intended recipient to access the sound recording.
User Storage provides the least protection for sound recordings
and may be the most far-reaching in terms of the ISP functions to
which it applies.179 It insulates an ISP from liability for storing a
copy of an infringing sound recording on its system at the direction
of a third party.180 This reinforces the contributory liability standard
suggested in Netcom.181 Under this safe harbor, an ISP could store
an illegal copy of a sound recording on its network and allow the
average user to access it. The only requirements for limited liability
are that the ISP must not have actual knowledge or reason to know
that the sound recording is infringing and may not receive a direct
financial benefit from having the infringing material reside on its
system.182
The Information Location Tools provision limits an ISP’s liability
for providing hyperlinks, online directories, and search engines that
link a user to unauthorized copies of sound recordings.183 The extent
of protection for sound recordings under this section is unclear. For
example, website operator and search engine, Lycos, claimed
immunity from copyright liability under the DMCA.184 Lycos has
argued that it is immune because it merely provides a link to the
location of sound files to its users and does not physically store the

178

17 U.S.C. § 512(b)(2)(D) (1996 & Supp. V 2001).
See id. § 512(c) (1996 & Supp. V 2001). Pursuant to this provision, the popular
Internet auction site Ebay won a summary judgment that it is not liable for copyright
infringement under the DMCA to the extent that it does not have the right and ability to
control infringing activity within the meaning of the DMCA. See Hendrickson v. Ebay,
2001 U.S. Dist. Lexis 14420 (C.D. Cal. 2001).
180
17 U.S.C. § 512 (b)(2)(D) (1996 & Supp. V 2001).
181
907 F. Supp. 1361 (N.D. Cal. 1995).
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17 U.S.C. § 512 (b)(2)(D) (1996 & Supp. V 2001).
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Id. at § 512(d).
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See Markiewicz, supra note 173, at 425.
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sound recordings on its servers.185 So far the courts have not found
much merit in Lycos’ argument.186
IV. CASE LAW
A. RIAA v. Diamond Multimedia Systems187
Late in 1998 the Recording Industry Association of America, Inc.
(hereinafter “RIAA”), in conjunction with the Alliance of Artists and
Recording Companies brought suit against Diamond Multimedia
Systems alleging violation of the AHRA.188 The recording industry
tried to get a preliminary injunction against Diamond Multimedia’s
introduction of the Rio Player into the marketplace, one of the first
devices with the ability to detach from a computer and still play MP3
files.189 The Rio player is a compact battery-operated music player
that comes bundled with software that allows a user to rip music
from a CD and change it into MP3 format for storage on a
computer’s hard drive.190 By connecting the Rio player to a
computer via a parallel port, the user can then transfer the MP3 files
from the hard drive to the Rio Player itself.191 Thus, the innovation
of the Rio player is that it allows MP3 files, which had previously
been confined only to use in conjunction with a computer, to be
taken away from the computer. For the first time, MP3 files could be
heard with the technology similar in purpose and function to a
typical walkman.

185
See Patricia Jacobus, Napster Suit Tests New Copyright Law, at
http://news.cnet.com/0~1005~200~1679581.html (last visited Nov. 2001).
186
See Napster I, 114 F. Supp. 2d at 919 n.24. But see A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster,
Inc., 239 F.3d 1004, 1025 (9th Cir. 2001) [hereinafter Napster II].
187
RIAA v. Diamond Multimedia Systems, 29 F. Supp. 2d 624 (C.D. Cal. 1998)
[hereinafter Diamond I].
188
See id.
189
Id. at 625.
190
Id.
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Id.

FINAL.BALABAN

1/10/02 5:10 PM

FORDHAM INTELL. PROP., MEDIA & ENT. L.J.

266

[Vol.12:235

1. District Court
The District Court found in favor of Diamond Multimedia based
on its interpretation of § 1001(11) that the “AHRA does not directly
prohibit serial copying.”192 In terms of the Rio player, the District
Court reasoned that a Rio player used in conjunction with a computer
does, in fact, satisfy the definition of serial copying under § 1001(11)
of the AHRA, but violates the Act only in a technical sense.193 In its
reasoning, the court divided serial copying into two steps: (1) a user
rips a song from a CD, converts it into an MP3 file, and stores it on
his hard drive; and (2) the user transfers the MP3 file to the Rio
player.194 Software had already been independently available to
accomplish the first step, which was rather commonplace and had
not invited litigation.195 Therefore, the Court concerned itself
primarily with the second step, which it considered to be the true
innovation of the Rio player.196
Focusing on the Rio player itself and its role in facilitating the
transfer of MP3 files, the District Court found that Diamond
Multimedia’s sole violation of the AHRA was that the Rio player
was not compliant with § 1002, which requires that digital audio
recording devices contain SCMS technology.197 Concentrating on
that aspect, the District Court found that incorporation of SCMS
technology would “accomplish nothing” since MP3 files do not
contain SCMS information.198 Therefore, the Court found that a Rio
player without SCMS technology was the functional equivalent of a
Rio player with SCMS technology incorporated into it.199 Thus,
although the defendant’s Rio player satisfied the definition of serial
copying under the AHRA, the Rio player only violated the AHRA in
a “technical sense.”200
192
193
194
195
196
197
198
199
200

Diamond I, 29 F. Supp. 2d at 631.
Id. at 632.
Id. at 631.
Id.
Id.
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Moreover, the District Court found that the AHRA does not
directly prohibit serial copying, and the only wrongful conduct of the
defendant was its failure to encode SCMS technology into the Rio
player, a technical shortcoming.201 The Court also found that the
failure to encode the SCMS technology was not likely to encourage
illegitimate uses of MP3 files since such uses were possible
regardless of the Rio player and regardless of the SCMS
technology.202 Therefore, the wrongful act of the defendant was not
linked to the irreparable harm claimed by the plaintiff.203
2. Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals
Perhaps unfortunate for recording artists, the opinion of the
District Court was later expanded upon by the Ninth Circuit Court of
Appeals, which went so far as to interpret the AHRA as specifically
exempting computer hard drives from coverage under its
provisions.204 The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals held that
computer hard drives simply do not fall within the definition of
“digital music recordings” as defined in § 1001 of the AHRA.205
Under § 1001(5)(B) the AHRA specifically exempts from its
provisions devices that are “material object[s] in which one or more
computer programs are fixed.”206 The Ninth Circuit held that
computer hard drives fall within the category of material objects and
are exempted from the AHRA.207
The Court also noted that under § 1001(3), the “primary purpose”
provision of the AHRA, the primary purpose of computers does not
201

Id.
Diamond I, 29 F. Supp. 2d at 633.
203
Id.
204
Diamond II, 180 F.3d at 1078.
205
Id. at 1078 (citing 17 U.S.C. § 1001(5)(A)) (defining a “digital musical recording” as
“a material object (i) in which are fixed, in a digital recording format, only sounds, and
material, statements, or instructions incidental to those fixed sounds, if any, and (ii) from
which the sounds and material can be perceived, reproduced, or otherwise communicated,
either directly or with the aid of a machine or device.”) (emphasis supplied).
206
17 U.S.C. § 1001(5)(B) exempts “material objects in which one or more computer
programs are fixed” from coverage by the AHRA.
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Diamond II, 180 F.3d at 1076.
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include the making or copying of digital audio recordings.208 Prior to
the Ninth Circuit’s decision, the AHRA already exempted
professional devices such as dictation machines, answering
machines, and other recording devices whose “primary purpose” is
the fixation of non-musical sounds.209 However, in its decision the
Ninth Circuit extended this exemption to include computer hard
drives, stating that the primary purpose of a computer is not to make
digital recordings of music and therefore the AHRA does not govern
the copying of music files to and from computer hard drives.210 The
primary purpose of a computer, according to the Ninth Circuit, “is to
run various programs and to record the data necessary to run those
programs and perform various tasks,” not to record music.211
Citing 17 U.S.C. § 1008, the Ninth Circuit reasoned that the result
of its decision is consistent with the purpose of the AHRA, to allow
consumers to make copies of audio recordings for their private,
noncommercial use.212 Citing Sony, where time-shifting by users of
home video recorders was held to be fair use, the Ninth Circuit also
suggested that the Rio player merely performs the equally innocuous
function of “space-shifting” music from a computer’s hard drive to a
portable player.213
B. UMG Recordings v. MP3.com214
Some of the evidence in this case strongly suggests that some
companies operating in the area of the Internet may have a
208

Id. at 1078 (citing 17 U.S.C. § 1001(3)).
See 17 U.S.C. § 1001(3). “A ‘digital audio recording device’ is any machine or
device of a type commonly distributed to individuals for use by individuals, whether or not
included with or as part of some other machine or device, the digital recording function of
which is designed or marketed for the primary purpose of, and that is capable of, making a
digital audio copied recording for private use, except for . . .”
210
See Diamond II, 180 F.3d. at 1078-79.
211
Id. at 1078.
212
Id. at 1079.
213
Id. See also infra Part IV(A) and Sony Corp. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464
U.S. 417 (1984) (upholding the “time-shifting” of copyrighted material enabled by the
introduction of the VCR as a new technology. “Time-shifting” allows VCR owners to tape
programs for later viewing.)
214
UMG Recordings v. MP3.com, 2000 WL 1262568 (S.D.N.Y. 2000).
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misconception that, because their technology is somewhat novel,
they are somehow immune from the ordinary applications of laws of
the United States, including copyright law. They need to understand
that the law’s domain knows no such limits.215
In September of 2000, several record labels brought suit against
MP3.com for its services introduced on its MY.MP3.com website on
or about January 10, 2000.216 On its website, the defendant primarily
offered two services.217 The defendant’s “Beam-It” service allowed
users to access CD’s from any computer at any location once the user
stepped through a series of low hurdles, which involved the user
exhibiting that he was in possession of the CD to be accessed.218
Moreover, the defendant’s “Instant Listening” service allowed users
to immediately listen to a sound recording in MP3 format once
having agreed to purchase a recording of the music.219
MP3.com made this feat possible by copying the contents of tens
of thousands of CD’s, converting them to MP3 format, and placing
them on its computer systems.220 The service was designed to
compete with other websites, such as MyPlay.com, which allowed
users to upload their own MP3 files onto the MyPlay website, and
the user could access his uploaded songs at a later date from any
location.221
However, unlike MyPlay.com, MP3.com actually
provided copies of the songs for its users to access. Users were
required only to prove possession of a CD, which is not equivalent to
ownership of the CD. Thus, it is estimated that a large number of
users were able to borrow, or otherwise obtain, copies of CD’s in
order to satisfy MyPlay.com’s ownership requirement.222 These
users, without ever having purchased a CD, were able to access the
content of CD’s provided on MyPlay.com.223 At trial, evidence
suggested that even the managers and engineers at MP3.com realized
215
216
217
218
219
220
221
222
223
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that the copying of music by My.MP3.com would very likely lead to
the copyright infringement of music. 224
Judge Rakoff in the Southern District of New York was
unequivocal in his decision against MP3.com. The Judge found that
even under the high standard of “clear and convincing evidence,”
MP3.com infringed plaintiffs’ copyrights by contributing to the
unauthorized copying of the contents of tens of thousands of
copyrighted CD’s containing hundreds of thousands of copyrighted
songs.225 Furthermore, the Judge dismissed the defendant’s fair use
arguments as little more than a sham since the users did not store
their own personal collection of CD’s on MP3.com’s website, but
rather accessed the MP3 collection supplied for commercial purposes
by MP3.com.226 The Court held that fair use does not include music
copied onto servers solely for the purpose of commercial use.227
The Judge also held that the plaintiffs satisfied their burden of
proof that the defendant had either actual knowledge of copyright
infringement or acted in reckless disregard of the high probability of
infringement.228 Since the plaintiffs offered clear and convincing
evidence that the defendant knew it was engaging in unlawful
activity, the Judge found that the defendant was willful in its
infringement of the plaintiffs’ copyrights.229 Moreover, because the
potential for harm from the infringement was deemed to be large, the
Judge awarded statutory damages amounting to $25,000 per CD and
left the determination of the number of CD’s that would qualify for
damages for a later date.230

224
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227
228
229
230

See MP3.com, 2000 WL 1262568, at *2.
See id. at *1.
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C. Universal City Studios v. Reimerdes231
Around the same time period in 2000, Judge Kaplan entered a
judgment upholding technical copyright protection measures used to
protect copyrighted content, such as full- length motion pictures,
found on digital versatile disks (“DVD’s”).232 In Reimerdes, eight
major motion picture studios brought suit against Eric Corley, a
leader among the computer hacker community and publisher of 2600
magazine, and two of his cohorts for distributing via a website a
computer program designed to circumvent technological measures
protecting copyrighted material on DVD’s.233
Most motion pictures that are distributed on DVD employ Content
Scramble System (hereinafter “CSS”) technology as a protection
against unauthorized access.234
CSS technology is an
encryption-based security and authentication system that requires the
use of appropriately configured hardware, such as a DVD player or a
computer DVD drive, to decrypt, unscramble and play back, but not
copy DVD’s.235 Thus, access to DVD’s employing CSS technology
is limited to devices licensed with the appropriate decryption
technology, which notably does not permit copying of DVD’s.236
Accordingly, the plaintiffs in Reimerdes were concerned that
distribution of a computer program that hacked through the
encryption technology would facilitate copyright infringement on a
large scale.237 This concern was compounded by the fact that DVD
revenues may represent up to 35% or 40% of revenue for the motion
picture studios (such as Warner Brothers).238 Therefore, the
circumvention of CSS technology would impede the development of
231

Universal City Studios v. Reimerdes, 111 F. Supp. 2d 294 (S.D.N.Y. 2000).
See id. (holding that posting computer software that decrypted encrypted movies for
download to DVD’s was a copyright violation).
233
See id.
234
See id. at 303, 309-10.
235
See id. at 309-10.
236
See Reimerdes, 111 F. Supp. 2d at 309-10.
237
See id.
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See id. at 310-11 (citing nn.69-70) (estimating the percentage of motion picture studio
revenue as represented by DVD sales based on trial transcript (King) at 403).
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technology to create new, otherwise lucrative initiatives for the
distribution of motion pictures in digital form.239
Nonetheless, the defendants were distributing via a website a
Windows-executable file (called DeCSS) created by another hacker,
fifteen-year-old Jon Johansen, which decrypts DVD’s on Windows
compatible computers.240
After decryption, computer files
containing the motion picture can easily be copied, repeatedly if
desired, for use on computers using either the Windows operating
system or the Linux operating system.241 Furthermore, once a
motion picture has been decrypted, it can be compressed using a
DivX compression algorithm that enables a full-length motion
picture to be compressed into a 650 MB file.242 The significance of
compression is that the file becomes much more manageable and can
be burned onto a single writeable CD using a conventional CD
burner.243
1. Distribution of Anti-circumvention Technology Violates the
DMCA.
The Reimerdes Court found that the defendants clearly violated §
1201(a)(2), which prohibits making available technologies developed
to defeat technological protections against unauthorized access to a
work, by distributing anti-circumvention measures via a web-site.244
The defendants violated § 1201(a)(2) by providing DeCSS on their
web site and also by providing links to other web sites created
primarily to offer DeCSS for download.245 The Court held that, by
providing links to other sites that automatically begin the process of
downloading DeCSS, the defendants were in effect engaged in the
functional equivalent of transferring the DeCSS code to the user

239
240
241
242
243
244
245

Id. at 315.
See id. at 311.
See Reimerdes, 111 F. Supp. 2d at 311.
See id. at 313.
See id. at 314.
Id. at 316.
Id. at 303-04.
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themselves.246 Moreover, because CSS is a technology developed to
effectively control access to copyrighted works, as defined by the
DMCA, and DeCSS was designed primarily for the purpose of
circumventing that technology, its distribution violated the
DMCA.247
During trial, the defendants argued unsuccessfully that DeCSS was
created primarily so that DVD’s could be viewed on the Linux
operating system for which no CSS compatible players were
available at the time.248 Therefore, the dissemination of DeCSS
should be exempted under § 1201(f) of the DMCA, which allows
exemptions for reverse engineering and for circumvention to achieve
“interoperability” with another computer program.249 However, the
Court found that under the DMCA, information enabling
interoperability with other programs could only be distributed to the
extent that it would not constitute infringement.250 Furthermore, the
Court held that the right to achieve interoperability, as defined in the
DMCA, “does not apply to public dissemination of means of
circumvention.”251 According to the Court, since the “only function
of the DeCSS program is to circumvent CSS” protection measures on
a Windows operating system, its purpose extended well beyond
achieving interoperability with the Linux operating system.252
Moreover, the Court found that the motivation of the defendants to
make DVD’s interoperable with the Linux operating system was
immaterial to the fact that they widely distributed software that
circumvented copyright protection measures.253
Similarly, the Court dismissed the defendants’ arguments that their
actions were exempted under other provisions of the DMCA. The
Court rejected the contention that the defendants’ actions could be
classified as good faith encryption research under the DMCA
because it found that the defendants’ research did not advance the
246
247
248
249
250
251
252
253

Reimerdes, 111 F. Supp. 2d at 325.
Id. at 317-18.
See id. at 319.
See id. at 320.
See DMCA § 1201(f).
Reimerdes, 111 F. Supp. 2d at 320.
See id. at 319.
Id.
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state of knowledge of encryption technology.254 This was evidenced
by the fact that the results of the research were not communicated to
the copyright owner in a timely manner.255 The Court also dismissed
the defendants’ weak assertion that they were assessing a security
testing system, a use that might be permitted under the DMCA.256
2. Distribution of Anti-circumvention Technology is Not a Fair
Use.
The defendants in Reimerdes claimed that the distribution of
DeCSS technology constituted fair use inasmuch as it allowed fair
and lawful uses of the protected materials.257 However, the Court
felt that although access control measures, such as CSS, involve
some risk of preventing fair and lawful uses of copyrighted material,
Congress realized this potential for limiting fair uses and struck a
balance through the DMCA.258 For example, Congress expressly
created a series of exceptions considered as fair uses, such as reverse
engineering, security testing, good faith encryption research, and
certain uses by nonprofit libraries and educational institutions.259 In
addition, Congress enacted a study on the effects of § 1201(a)(1) and
expressly prohibited its application to subsequent actions of a person
“once he or she obtained authorized access to a copy of a
[copyrighted] work. . . .”260 Therefore, the Court felt that the
traditional defenses to copyright infringement, such as fair use, only
apply after it has been established that access to the material is
authorized under the DMCA.261
Notably, the Court rejected the application of fair use under the
Sony case, stating that the case “involved a construction of the
Copyright Act that has been overruled by the later enactment of the
254
255
256
257
258
259
260
261

Id. at 304.
See id. at 321; see also 17 U.S.C. § 1201(g)(2).
Reimerdes, 111 F. Supp. 2d at 321; see also 17 U.S.C. § 1201(j).
Reimerdes, 111 F. Supp. 2d at 321-22.
Id. at 322.
Id. at 323.
Id.
Id.
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DMCA. . . .”262 Regardless, the Court felt that it was facing a
different question than that faced in Sony.263 In Sony the Court faced
the question of whether manufacturers could be held liable for
infringement by purchasers of equipment for which there were a
multitude of non-infringing uses.264 In Reimerdes the Court
considered the question of whether it should uphold the
dissemination of anti-circumvention technology that held only the
possibility (not a multitude) of non-infringing uses.265 Thus, the
Court felt that the mere possibility of non-infringing uses of a
technology developed to circumvent access measures protected by
the DMCA did not exempt the technology from liability.266
3. The DMCA Does Not Unduly Restrict First Amendment Rights.
The Court in Reimerdes also held that the “anti-trafficking
provision of the DMCA as applied to the posting of computer code
that circumvents measures that control access to copyrighted works
in digital form is a valid exercise of Congress’ authority.”267 The
Court made it clear that the anti-trafficking provision of the DMCA
serves an important governmental interest by protecting copyrighted
works from digital piracy, thereby “promoting the availability of
[copyrighted] content in digital form.”268 It found that any impact on
the dissemination of a programmer’s ideas, through limitations in the
distribution of their programs, was purely incidental to the overriding
concerns of promoting the digital distribution of copyrighted works
and protecting them from piracy.269
In its ruling, the Court determined that the application of “contentneutral” limitations on the non-speech, functional aspects of a
262
Reimerdes, 111 F. Supp. 2d at 323; see also Sony Corp. v. Universal City Studios,
Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 441 (1984).
263
Reimerdes, 111 F. Supp. 2d at 323.
264
See Sony, 464 U.S. at 420; see also Reimerdes, 111 F. Supp. 2d at 323.
265
Reimerdes, 111 F. Supp. 2d at 323.
266
Id. at 323-24.
267
Id. at 332. “[T]he Supreme Court has made clear that copyright protection itself is
the ‘engine of free expression’.” Id. at 330.
268
Id. at 330.
269
Id. at 329.
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computer program prevents the circumvention of technology without
unduly restricting expressive activities.270 The Court concluded that,
whereas computer code is expressive, it also has a distinctly
functional, non-speech aspect.271 Moreover, it found that the
functional aspects of the programmer’s computer code do more than
simply express the concepts of the computer programmer.272
Therefore, by placing “content-neutral” limitations on the functional
aspects of the computer program, the DMCA can prevent the
circumvention of technology without unduly restricting the
expressive aspects of the computer code.273
However, the Court emphasized that its holding concerning the
First Amendment is narrow in its applicability. The Court stated that
its holding
is limited (1) to programs that circumvent access controls
to copyrighted works in digital form in circumstances in
which (2) there is no other practical means of preventing
infringement through use of the programs, and (3) the
regulation is motivated by a desire to prevent performance
of the function for which the programs exist rather than
any message they might convey.274
D. A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc.275
In December of 1999, a group of eighteen record labels and music
publishers sought a preliminary injunction against Napster claiming
that Napster’s file-sharing services constitute both contributory and
vicarious infringement of copyrights on a mass scale.276 The
plaintiffs introduced evidence that as much as 87% of the music files
examined by their experts represent copyrighted material for which
270
271
272
273
274
275
276

See Reimerdes, 111 F. Supp. 2d at 329.
Id. at 328-29.
Id.
See id. at 329.
Id. at 333.
Napster I, 114 F. Supp. 2d 896.
Id. at 900.
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the copyright owners are not compensated when distributed through
Napster’s file-sharing system.277 Furthermore, internal documents
stated that, by the end of 2000, Napster would have serviced
approximately seventy-five million users.278 Conversely, Napster
asserted that it does not infringe any copyrighted material because
Napster itself does not download or store any music on its own
computers, but merely provides the mechanism through which its
users can locate and download music.279 Thus, Napster claimed
immunity from liability as an information location tool qualified for
limited liability under 512(d) of the DMCA.280 Furthermore, Napster
asserted that any incidental copyright infringement is fair use under §
107 of the Copyright Act of 1976.281
The District Court issued a preliminary injunction against Napster,
finding that the plaintiffs had established a prima facie case of direct
copyright infringement; that downloading and uploading of MP3
files by Napster users was not fair use; that plaintiffs had established
a likelihood of success; and that plaintiffs were entitled to injunctive
relief.282 However, the Ninth Circuit temporarily stayed the
preliminary injunction, pending modifications by the District
Court.283
1. The Ninth Circuit: An Epilogue for Napster?
On review of the District Court’s decision, the Ninth Circuit
upheld the preliminary injunction granted by the District Court
subject only to certain modifications.284 For instance, the Ninth
277

Id. at 903.
Id. at 902.
279
Id.
280
Napster I, 114 F. Supp. 2d at 919.
281
“In determining whether the use made of a work in any particular case is a fair use
the factors to be considered shall include: (1) the purpose and character of the use, including
whether such use is of a commercial nature or is for nonprofit educational purposes; (2) the
nature of the copyrighted work; (3) the amount and substantiality of the portion used in
relation to the copyrighted work as a whole; and (4) the effect of the use upon the potential
market for or value of the copyrighted work.” 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2001).
282
Napster I, 114 F. Supp. 2d at 926.
283
Napster II, 239 F.3d 1004, 1029.
284
Id. at 1027-28. The Ninth Circuit outright rejected Napster’s arguments that the
278
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Circuit found that the preliminary injunction was overbroad because
it placed too much of a burden on Napster to ensure that “no
‘copying, downloading, uploading, transmitting, or distributing’ of
plaintiffs’ works occur on the system.”285 Instead, the Ninth Circuit
placed the burden on the plaintiffs to provide notice to Napster of the
copyrighted works available on the Napster system before conferring
upon Napster the duty to police its service for infringing works.286
Specifically, the Court modified the preliminary injunction such
that contributory liability can only be imposed upon Napster to the
extent that it “(1) receives reasonable knowledge of specific
infringing files with copyrighted musical compositions and sound
recordings; (2) knows or should know that such files are available on
the Napster system; and (3) fails to act to prevent viral distribution of
the works.”287 In addition, “Napster may be vicariously liable when
it fails to affirmatively use its ability to patrol its system [and] to
preclude access to potentially infringing files listed in its search
index.”288
a. Napster Facilitates Infringing Uses of Copyrighted Music.
In its ruling, the Ninth Circuit agreed with the District Court that
Napster does indeed violate two of the copyright holders’ exclusive
rights: the right of reproduction under 17 U.S.C. § 106(1) and the
right of distribution under § 106(3).289 It also rejected Napster’s
affirmative defense that it does not directly infringe plaintiffs’
copyrights because its users are engaged in the fair use of
copyrighted material.290 Napster argued that such potential fair uses
of its service include “space-shifting” music files, sampling of
incomplete portions of music files, and the authorized distribution of
injunction was unconstitutional under the First Amendment as well as Napster’s affirmative
defenses of waiver, implied license, and copyright misuse.
285
Id. at 1027.
286
See id.
287
Id.
288
Napster II, 239 F.3d at 1027.
289
Id. at 1014.
290
Id. at 1016-17.

FINAL.BALABAN

2001]

1/10/02 5:10 PM

BATTLE OF THE MUSIC INDUSTRY

279

new and unsigned artists’ works.291 However, the Ninth Circuit
upheld the District Court’s determination that if the case were to go
to trial, space-shifting, time-shifting, and sampling of incomplete
portions of music files would not be likely to qualify for the
affirmative defense of fair use.292 It also rejected Napster’s argument
that it should be permitted to function for the part it plays in the
permissive reproduction of independent or established artists’ works
because the plaintiffs did not seek to enjoin this activity.293
Napster tried to liken its services to the “space shifting” upheld in
Diamond Multimedia and “time-shifting” as upheld in Sony.294
However, the Ninth Circuit distinguished Napster’s file-sharing
services from both space-shifting and time-shifting, emphasizing that
unlike the use of Napster’s services, the uses upheld in Diamond
Multimedia and in Sony do not include the displacement of sales
through public dissemination of copyrighted materials to millions of
persons free of charge.295 Moreover, the Ninth Circuit determined
that Diamond Multimedia and Sony upheld as fair use the copying of
copyrighted works for personal use, but not copying for commercial
use or for mass distribution to the general public.296
To a large extent, the Ninth Circuit’s ruling followed from the
proceeding in the District Court, where Judge Patel observed that
space-shifting of music is not a substantial use of Napster’s
service.297 According to the District Court, whereas the primary
291

Napster I, 114 F. Supp. 2d at 913; see also 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2001).
Napster II, 239 F.3d at 1015, 1019. See 17 U.S.C. § 107 (enumerating the factors
considered in determining fair use: “(1) the purpose and character of the use; (2) the nature
of the copyrighted work; (3) the amount and substantiality of the portion used in relation to
the work as a whole; and (4) the effect of the use upon the potential market for [the work] or
[the] value of the copyrighted work.”)
293
Napster II, 239 F.3d at 1019.
294
Napster I, 114 F. Supp. 2d at 915-16. See Diamond II, 180 F.3d 1072 (upholding the
“space-shifting” of music off of computer hard drives for portable use in the Rio player); see
also Sony Corp. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417 (1984) (upholding the “timeshifting” of copyrighted material enabled by the introduction of the VCR as a new
technology). “Time-shifting” is the copying of copyrighted material, such as television
programming, for private non-commercial use at a later time.
295
Napster II, 239 F.3d at 1019; see also Napster I, 114 F. Supp. 2d at 915-16.
296
Napster II, 239 F.3d at 1019.
297
Napster I, 114 F. Supp. 2d at 916.
292
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purpose of the Rio player in Diamond Multimedia was to space-shift
music files for portable use, Napster users access its service for the
purpose of downloading unauthorized copies of copyrighted music
and avoiding purchase costs.298 In addition, the District Court noted
that most Napster users do not access Napster for the purpose of
space-shifting music for portable listening at different locations.299
Similarly, the District Court distinguished Napster use from the fair
use of time-shifting upheld in Sony, observing that VCRs facilitate
the taping of material that the viewer has been invited to see entirely
free of charge. In the view of the District Court, Napster facilitates
the copying of music files for which the plaintiffs almost always
charge for access.300
Napster also asserted the affirmative defense of fair use, claiming
that its services are akin to visiting and sampling music at a free
listening station at a record store and to other forms of online
sampling.301 However, the Ninth Circuit upheld the District Court’s
rejection of this defense on the grounds that sampling music through
Napster is a commercial use that adversely affects the market for
plaintiffs’ copyrighted music.302 The Ninth Circuit agreed with the
District Court’s distinction that unlike record stores, Napster
transfers copies of music to its listeners without first requiring them
to purchase the music.303 Likewise, the Ninth Circuit found that
unlike other forms of sampling over the Internet, which typically
allow for only thirty-to-sixty-second samples of music, Napster
provides access to entire songs.304 In addition, the Ninth Circuit
found that even in the unlikely event that Napster use does not
adversely affect the market for the plaintiffs’ copyrighted works, the

298

Napster II, 239 F.3d at 1019.
See Napster I, 114 F. Supp. 2d at 904-05. Space-shifting of a user’s own private
music collection through Napster’s service would require a user to log on to Napster from
one computer, leave the location of that computer (while maintaining the computer’s
connection to Napster), travel to another computer at another location, and then download
music files onto the second computer from the first.
300
Id. at 913.
301
Id.
302
Napster II, 239 F.3d at 1018.
303
See id.
304
Napster I, 114 F. Supp. 2d at 913-14.
299
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unauthorized spread of music by Napster should not deprive the
copyright holders of the right to license the material.305
Overall, the Ninth Circuit agreed with the District Court’s
characterization of Napster’s service as a commercial mechanism
that infringes copyrighted material without transforming or adding
value to the copyrighted work in any way.306 The Ninth Circuit
noted that the mere retransmission of an original copyrighted work
through a new medium is unlikely to constitute fair use.307 It also
noted that commercial use does not require a showing of direct
economic benefit, but may be demonstrated by the repeated and
exploitative unauthorized copying of copyrighted works made in
order to save an expense, such as the expense of purchasing
authorized copies of musical works.308
b. Napster Is Subject to Contributory Liability.
In order to determine the likelihood of Napster being held liable as
a contributory infringer at trial, the Ninth Circuit considered whether
Napster had the requisite knowledge of the infringing activity and
whether it induced, caused, or materially contributed to the
infringing conduct of another.309 After considering the record, the
Ninth Circuit agreed with the District Court that Napster both knew
of and materially contributed to the infringement of copyrighted
music, but disagreed with the District Court’s reasoning as to the
knowledge requirement.310 Rejecting the District Court’s view that
general knowledge of infringing conduct satisfies the knowledge
305

Id.
Napster II, 239 F.3d at 1015.
307
Id. (citing Infinity Broadcast Corp. v. Kirkwood, 150 F.3d 104, 108 (2d Cir. 1998))
(finding the retransmission of a radio broadcast over a telephone line does not transform the
original work and is not a fair use).
308
Id.
309
See Napster I, 114 F. Supp. 2d at 918 (quoting Gershwin Publ’g Corp. v. Columbia
Artists Mgmt., Inc., 443 F.2d 1159, 1162 (2d Cir. 1971) (noting that a contributory infringer
is “one who, with knowledge of the infringing activity, induces, causes or materially
contributes to the infringing conduct of another”).
310
Napster II, 239 F.3d at 1020-22. The Ninth Circuit agreed with the District Court
that Napster materially contributes to the infringement of copyrighted material because
without its services Napster users could not easily find and download music.
306
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requirement, the Ninth Circuit held that a defendant cannot be held to
contributory liability unless it has specific knowledge of infringing
conduct.311
In its defense, Napster argued that because its software is
incapable of determining specific infringing uses, Napster could not
know of any particular instances of infringement and does not satisfy
the knowledge requirement of contributory liability.312 Napster
argued that this was true even though its employees may have
generally been aware of Napster’s potential for infringing uses.313
Therefore, Napster argued that it cannot reasonably verify infringing
uses on its online directory and should not have to police its service
for infringing material.314 The District Court rejected Napster’s
arguments stating that general knowledge that third parties
performed copyrighted works satisfies the knowledge element of
contributory infringement and that actual knowledge of specific acts
of infringement is not required.315 However, the Ninth Circuit did
not agree with the District Court’s determination and instead ruled
that the standard for determining knowledge for the purpose of
contributory liability hinges upon the defendant’s specific
knowledge, not only its general knowledge, of infringing uses.316
Furthermore, the Ninth Circuit placed the burden upon the plaintiffs
to provide the necessary documentation to the defendant showing
that there is likely infringement.317
In its reasoning, the Ninth Circuit followed a logic similar to that
in Sony, noting that although file-sharing is currently used primarily
for the infringement of copyrighted works, in the future file-sharing
311

Id. at 1021.
Napster I, 114 F. Supp. 2d at 918.
313
Id. Napster’s software cannot read watermarks or any other information that might
provide notice of copyrighted material.
314
Id.
315
Id. See also Gershwin Publ’g Corp. v. Columbia Artists Mgmt., Inc., 443 F.2d 1159,
1163 (2d Cir. 1971).
316
Napster II, 239 F.3d at 1021 (citing Religious Tech. Ctr. v. Netcom On-Line
Communication Services, Inc., 907 F. Supp. 1361, at 1374-75 (N.D. Cal. 1995) (denying
Netcom’s motion for summary judgment of noninfringement and plaintiff’s motion for
judgment on the pleadings, finding that a disputed issue of fact existed as to whether the
operator had sufficient knowledge of infringing activity).
317
Id.
312
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may be capable of commercially significant non-infringing uses.318
Since Napster may be capable of substantial non-infringing uses in
the future, the Ninth Circuit refused to impute the requisite
knowledge of infringing uses from the mere possibility or even the
general knowledge that at present Napster’s services have been and
may be used to infringe plaintiffs’ copyrights.319 Thus, according to
the Ninth Circuit, the District Court overemphasized the current
infringing uses of Napster and devalued its possible non-infringing
uses in the future.320
Having determined that a finding of contributory liability requires
the specific knowledge of infringing uses, the Ninth Circuit moved
on to the question of whether Napster had specific knowledge of
infringing uses of its services. The Ninth Circuit found that Napster
did have the requisite specific knowledge of infringing uses because
the RIAA had provided Napster with a listing of more than 12,000
infringing files located on Napster’s system.321 Therefore, the Court
upheld the determination that pending a trial, the plaintiffs would
likely prevail in establishing that Napster had knowledge of
infringing uses.322
c. Napster Is Subject to Vicarious Liability.
The Ninth Circuit agreed with the District Court that the plaintiffs
would be likely to succeed at trial in holding Napster to vicarious
liability.323 It upheld the District Court’s determination that Napster
has a financial interest in the infringing uses of its service and, at the
same time, has failed to exercise both its right and its ability to

318
Id. See Sony, 464 U.S. at 447-48 (1984) (refusing to hold the manufacturer and
retailers of video tape recorders liable for contributory infringement despite evidence that
such machines could be and were used to infringe plaintiffs’ copyrighted television shows).
319
Napster II, 239 F.3d at 1021. See also Sony, 464 U.S. at 442. Following Sony, the
Ninth Circuit declined to impute the requisite level of knowledge where the defendants
made and sold equipment capable of both infringing and “significant noninfringing uses.”
320
Napster II, 239 F.3d at 1021.
321
Id. at 1022.
322
Id. at 1021.
323
See id.
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supervise the infringing activity.324 Moreover, the Ninth Circuit
found evidence of Napster’s financial interest in the infringing
activities from several reports submitted by the plaintiffs in the
District Court, including the Teece Report, the Jay Report, and the
Fine Report. 325 On the whole, the reports tie Napster’s future
revenue directly to its increase in its user base, which, in turn, grows
with increases in the quantity and quality of music available through
Napster’s service.326 Notwithstanding the reports, the Ninth Circuit
upheld the District Court’s review of Napster’s own internal
documents, which further revealed Napster’s strategy of attaining a
critical mass with plans to “monetize” its user base in the future.327
Notably, some potential revenue sources for Napster include targeted
email, advertising, commissions from links to commercial websites,
the direct marketing of CD’s, Napster products, and CD burners and
rippers.328 In addition, the very existence of such a large and easily
monetized user base makes Napster a potentially attractive
acquisition for larger, more established firms.
Having determined Napster’s financial interest in the infringing
uses of its services, the Ninth Circuit found that Napster did, in fact,
have the right and ability to supervise the infringing activity on its
site.329 In actuality, Napster expressly reserved the right to supervise
infringing activity through a disclaimer on its website.330 Moreover,
324

Id. at 1023.
See Napster II, 239 F.3d at 1016-17 (stating that “[p]laintiffs’ expert, Dr. David J.
Teece, studied several issues (“Teece Report”), including whether plaintiffs had suffered or
were likely to suffer harm in their existing and planned businesses due to Napster use.” The
Teece Report showed that Napster raises the barriers to plaintiffs’ entry into the market for
the digital downloading of music. The Ninth Circuit then stated that the “[p]laintiffs’
expert, Dr. E. Deborah Jay, conducted a survey (the “Jay Report”) using a random sample of
college and university students to track their reasons for using Napster and the impact
Napster had on their music purchases.” The report found evidence of lost sales attributable
to college use. Furthermore, “plaintiffs also offered a study conducted by Michael Fine,
Chief Executive Officer of Soundscan, (the “Fine Report”) to determine the effect of online
sharing of MP3 files in order to show irreparable harm. Fine found that online file-sharing
had resulted in a loss of ‘album’ sales within college markets.”).
326
Napster I, 114 F. Supp. 2d at 902.
327
Id.
328
Id.
329
See Napster II, 239 F.3d at 1022.
330
See id. at 1023. On its website, Napster expressly reserved the “right to refuse
service and terminate accounts in [its] discretion, including, but not limited to, if Napster
325
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since a “right to police must be exercised to its fullest extent” to
avoid vicarious liability, the Ninth Circuit upheld the District Court’s
finding that Napster failed to prevent the exchange of copyrighted
material.331 The Ninth Circuit also indicated that Napster may not
have been able to avoid liability without a disclaimer simply by
turning a “blind eye” to the infringement.332
However, in its decision, the Ninth Circuit lessened the burden
upon Napster to police its service based upon the limits of the
architecture of its software.333 Notably, Napster’s software is set up
such that the information about the musical works distributed
through its system is limited to the names of the music files, as input
by its users, on the search indices.334 Therefore, the Ninth Circuit
determined that Napster must police only its search indices for
infringing recordings.335
d. Napster May Qualify For Limited Liability Under the
DMCA, But the AHRA Does Not Apply.
Interestingly, in the face of Diamond Multimedia, Napster tried to
argue that MP3 files are covered by the AHRA.336 Napster argued
that the exchange of MP3 files through its service is the type of
“noncommercial use” protected from infringement actions under the
AHRA.337 Napster asserted that it cannot be held secondarily liable
for its users’ non-actionable exchange of copyrighted musical
recordings through its service.338 Conversely, the Ninth Circuit
agreed with the District Court that the AHRA does not apply to MP3
files transmitted between computer hard drives.339 Following from
believes that user conduct violates applicable law . . . or for any reason in Napster’s sole
discretion, with or without cause.”
331
Id.
332
Id.
333
Id. at 1023-24.
334
Napster II, 239 F.3d at 1024.
335
Id.
336
See Diamond II, 180 F.3d at 1078.
337
Napster II, 239 F.3d at 1023-24; see also 17 U.S.C. § 1008 (1996 & Supp. 2001).
338
Napster II, 239 F.3d at 1024.
339
Id.
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Diamond Multimedia, the Ninth Circuit held that MP3 files
transmitted through Napster’s file-sharing service are not digital
audio recordings, as defined by the AHRA, because their “‘primary
purpose’ is not to make digital audio copies of recordings.”340
However, the Ninth Circuit did not accept the District Court’s
overbroad assertions that § 512 of the DMCA will not ever limit the
liability of contributory infringers.341 Section 512(d) limits the
liability of ISP’s acting in the narrow capacity of providing
hyperlinks, online directories, and search engines that link a user to
unauthorized copies of sound recordings.342 Notably, the District
Court rejected Napster’s argument that it should qualify for limited
liability under § 512(d) of the DMCA.343 Although the District
Court found that the DMCA does provide for limited liability for
contributory infringers under § 512(d)(1)(A), it does so only to the
extent that a service provider does not have actual knowledge of
infringement.344 Since the District Court determined that Napster
had actual knowledge of infringement, it refused to limit Napster’s
liability under § 512(d) of the DMCA.345
The Ninth Circuit rejected this position and recognized that
although the balance of hardships may tip in favor of the plaintiffs,
the question of limited liability under the DMCA would have to be
more fully developed at trial.346 Accordingly, the Ninth Circuit
found that Napster raised several significant questions under the
DMCA, including: “(1) whether Napster is an Internet service
provider as defined by 17 U.S.C. § 512(d); (2) whether copyright
owners must give a service provider ‘official’ notice of infringing
activity in order for it to have knowledge or awareness of infringing
activity on its system; and (3) whether Napster complies with §
340

Id. See Diamond II, 180 F.3d at 1078.
Napster II, 239 F.3d at 1025.
342
See 17 U.S.C. § 512(d) (1996 & Supp. 2001).
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Napster I, 114 F. Supp. 2d at 919 n.24.
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See id. See also DMCA § 512(d)(C). The court did not address the question of
whether Napster, a website, could even qualify as a service provider for purposes of the
DMCA. Service providers typically provide users access to the Internet. Websites, on the
other hand, provide locations for users to visit once on the Internet.
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Napster I, 114 F. Supp. 2d at 919.
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512(i), which requires a service provider to timely establish a
detailed copyright compliance policy.”347
CONCLUSION: POLICY CONCERNING FILE-SHARING—STRIKING A
BALANCE BETWEEN THE INCENTIVE TO CREATE AND THE PROMOTION
OF NEW TECHNOLOGY
The advantages of file-sharing must be balanced with the need to
provide artists with the incentive to create new works. Traditionally,
musical artists have been held in high regard. In fact, history has
developed a long list of musicians, from Mozart and Beethoven to
the more recent Copland and even Madonna, all of whom have been
rewarded for their efforts.348 Such rewards have provided the
incentive for musicians to create the works that have become staples
in our society. Napster, however, has built its service entirely at the
expense of musicians. In the present day, Napster takes monetary
rewards away from artists for its own benefit. Napster has, with very
little effort, usurped the works of a multitude of musicians and
packaged them into one website for its own benefit. It robs artists of
hard-earned royalties that they deserve for the effort they put into
creating their music.
Realizing the inherent problems introduced by the change in the
distribution of music from physical album sales toward digital
transmission of music over the Internet, Congress has recently
implemented both the DPRA and the DMCA. Although imperfect,
these statutes go a long way toward the goal of compensating
347

Id.
See THE LAROUSSE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF MUSIC (Geoffrey Hindley ed., 1996). It is
interesting to note that Mozart, who enjoyed international fame beginning early in his
career, died in poverty. Id. at 242. After provoking his own dismissal from his post in the
court of Salzburg, Mozart attempted late in life to earn his living as a freelance composer
and performer. Id. However, a general lack of copyright protection in Europe during the
late 18th century made it difficult for Mozart to make a living solely as a freelance artist,
contributing to his pauper status. Id. Thus, toward the end of his life Mozart, despite
constant acclaim, was unable to profit from his immense talent. Id.
Beethoven, on the other hand, born more than fifty years after Mozart, appears to
have been the first composer to attempt to live exclusively as a freelance artist from the
beginning of his career. Id. at 264. Although Beethoven often found himself in financial
difficulties, he was by no measure a poor man upon his death. Id.
348
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musicians for the distribution of their works over the Internet. If a
balance is to be struck whereby copyright owners are compensated
for the digital distribution of their works, then the courts must follow
the lead of Congress and protect copyright owners’ interests. Should
the courts uphold the interests of copyright owners along the lines of
Reimerdes and Napster, then perhaps the music, publishing, film,
and video industries can work toward discovering a reliable
mechanism for the mass licensing of copyrighted works over the
Internet.

